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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether declines in inhibitory functioning could 
influence older adults’ beliefs about false or suspicious information presented to them. 
Participants included 40 older adults (29 female, mean age = 72.2 years) and 40 younger 
adults (30 female, mean age = 19.38 years). Participants first read a suspicious story and 
were required to generate words from letter strings periodically throughout the task, 
some of which were prefixes of words describing apparently truthful statements, 
apparently untruthful statements, or neutral statements from the story. Participants then 
read a crime report containing both true and false information about a criminal 
defendant, and then made guilt and character judgements about the target. It was 
hypothesised that older adults would be unable to inhibit the ‘suspicious’ claims made in 
the story (as evidenced by the fact that they would generate more apparently untruthful 
words than younger adults in the word completion task), and that older adults would 
believe the false information from the crime report and incorporate it into their 
impressions of the criminal. It was expected that both of these relationships would be 
mediated by inhibitory deficits. Contrary to predictions, results indicated that younger 
adults showed more activation for apparently truthful, apparently untruthful, and neutral 
words than older adults. Findings also revealed that while older adults’ ratings of the 
criminal did not appear to be influenced by the false statements, younger adults 
appeared to over-correct for the false information.  However this effect was not 
mediated by inhibitory deficits. These results failed to indicate that inhibitory 
functioning affects older adults’ beliefs about misleading information. Reasons for these 
findings are considered, along with suggestions for future research. 
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How Can They Possibly Believe That? The Influence of Age-Related Inhibitory Losses  
 
on Belief in False and Suspicious Information 
 
A widespread belief about elderly people is that they are more susceptible to 
being targeted by scam artists and frauds. Unfortunately, like many stereotypes, this 
view of older people has its origins in truth. While the actual prevalence of fraud against 
older people is relatively low, it is the most common of all crimes committed against 
this age group, thus making it a significant issue (Muscat, James, & Graycar, 2002). The 
uncertainty, then, is why this occurs. Many reasons have been suggested, ranging from 
older adults’ dependence on others, to their social isolation (Smith, 1999). There is also 
the possibility that mild dementia in some older adults may influence their judgement 
and decision-making abilities, making them more susceptible to fraud. However, while 
there are a number of factors that may contribute to older adults’ vulnerability to this 
crime, the answer may also lie in the findings of research on the cognitive deficits 
associated with ageing.  
 Pioneered by Hasher and Zacks (1988) there is a substantial number of studies 
supporting the notion that the decline in performance of older adults on cognitive tasks 
is due to the deterioration of their inhibitory abilities; that is, their ability to suppress 
thoughts and behaviours that are unwanted or irrelevant (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). 
Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) theory postulates that because inhibition affects functions 
such as encoding and retrieval of information from memory, inhibition may be the 
source of a range of cognitive difficulties experienced by older adults. As this decline in 
inhibitory functioning is believed to occur during the natural ageing process, its effects 
are evident even amongst those who are cognitively intact. 
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The current study aimed to explore Hasher and Zacks’ theory further by 
investigating whether inhibitory deficits in older adults influence the beliefs they form 
about suspicious or misleading information presented to them. It was firstly proposed 
that when suspicion was aroused, older adults would be unable to inhibit facts that were 
very likely to be false, thus increasing the number of ‘false’ facts (or words related to 
them) available in working memory. Furthermore, it was proposed that even if older 
adults were presented with explicitly false information about a particular event, they 
would be unable to inhibit the false facts, thus incorporating them into their beliefs 
about the event.  
 In order to provide a proper background for this hypothesis, a review of the 
relevant literature is needed. Firstly, a general overview of the research on inhibition is 
presented, followed by an examination of how inhibitory functioning operates in older 
adults. The impact of decline in inhibitory abilities on social behaviour is then 
discussed, with an emphasis on how older adults may form beliefs about information 
presented to them. 
Inhibition 
While researchers have previously been interested in excitatory mechanisms 
which serve to keep mental contents active in working memory (Bodenhausen & 
Macrae, 1998), only recently has interest been turned towards inhibitory systems, which 
researchers have acknowledged as essential for the control of thoughts and actions (e.g. 
(Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Houghton & Tipper, 1996). The 
reason for this is that inhibitory mechanisms are responsible for the suppression of 
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unwanted or irrelevant thoughts and actions, therefore enabling the contents of working 
memory to be controlled (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  
 Three features of inhibition are important in cognitive functioning. 
Firstly, it enables focus on task-relevant information by preventing task- irrelevant 
information from entering working memory. Secondly, if information that has been 
encoded becomes less relevant, inhibition deletes it so that relevant information can be 
processed without difficulty. Taken together, these first two functions result in minimal 
distracting material affecting working memory during encoding and retrieval. Finally, 
inhibition enables control over strong thoughts and actions, meaning one can assess the 
suitability of a response before acting upon it (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Hasher et al., 
1999; Yoon, May, & Hasher, 2000). 
Researchers have conceptualised inhibition in many different ways (DeJong, 
Coles, & Logan, 1995; Dempster, 1993), with one of the most common distinctions 
being between behavioural, or motor inhibition (e.g. DeJong et al., 1995; Sweeney, 
Rosano, Berman, & Luna, 2001) and cognitive, or attentional inhibition (e.g. Dulaney, 
Marks, & Link, 2004; Houghton & Tipper, 1996; McDowd & Filion, 1992), the latter of 
which is most pertinent to the aims of this paper. What is of most relevance within the 
category of cognitive inhibition is the distinction between unintentional and intentional 
inhibitory processes (Harnishfeger, 1995). Also known as hierarchical and lateral 
inhibition (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998), this distinction highlights the way inhibition 
manifests in our thoughts and behaviours - consciously or unconsciously. Hierarchical 
inhibition is thought of as a goal-related, conscious process, in that the individual 
suppresses the activation of an item after deciding whether it is relevant or not 
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(Harnishfeger, 1995). Thus, we can work towards personal goals by controlling our own 
thoughts and behaviours. In contrast, lateral inhibition is thought of as an automatic 
process that occurs outside our conscious awareness. Rather than controlling our 
thoughts and behaviours towards a particular goal, lateral inhibition occurs by 
suppressing irrelevant items that are activated with multiple relevant items, meaning that 
irrelevant items do not even reach our awareness (Harnishfeger, 1995). While people’s 
beliefs about information presented to them may be influenced by both lateral and 
hierarchical inhibition, the current study is more focused on hierarchical inhibition. The 
reason for this is that research has suggested that this type of inhibition can occur if 
people are both aware of and motivated to inhibit certain information, for example 
stereotypes (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Thus, if people are aware that information 
is false, misleading, or suspicious, this may lead to a conscious effort to suppress the 
information. 
 While research has uncovered the distinctions between different types of 
inhibition, there is also a great deal of interest in how different factors affect it. 
Variables such as circadian arousal patterns and time of day have been associated with 
changes in inhibitory functioning (Hasher, Chung, May, & Foong, 2002; Yoon et al., 
2000), as have long-term factors such as age and neurological damage (e.g. Carlson, 
Moses, & Hix, 1998; Shimamura, Jurica, Mangels, Gershberg, & Knight, 1995; Zellner 
& Bauml, 2006). Studies have found that people with frontal lobe lesions have trouble 
with inhibition tasks (Shimamura et al., 1995), and deficits in both cognitive and 
behavioural inhibition have been found in people with disorders such as Schizophrenia, 
Conduct Disorder, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 
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1994). However, one of the most significant findings is the effect that age has on 
inhibition. The findings of numerous studies support the notion that inhibitory 
functioning develops over time in childhood, eventually matures, and then begins to 
deteriorate in old age (Dempster, 1992; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Wilson & Kipp, 1998). 
Indeed, it is the decreasing inhibitory abilities of older adults that are of most interest to 
the current study. This is now discussed in more detail, explaining the development of 
the literature in the area and the growing interest in the research community. 
Inhibition and Ageing 
 Ageing is associated with a number of significant life changes, most notably 
cognitive ones such as slowing of information processing and memory loss (Band, 
Ridderinkhof, & Segalowitz, 2002). Most of these deficits are associated with frontal 
lobe function (McDowd & Oseaskreger, 1991), and the gradual decline of these abilities 
also coincides with the deterioration of cortical tissue in the frontal lobes (Raz, 2000). 
Indeed, many theorists argue that it is primarily the changes in the frontal lobes that 
account for many of the cognitive deficits experienced by older adults, including 
inhibitory deficits (e.g. Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994; West, 
1996). Indeed, this argument corresponds with evidence from studies finding that 
deficits in inhibitory abilities are also evident in young children, whose frontal lobes 
have not yet fully matured (Harnishfeger & Pope, 1996; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, 
Logan, & Tannock, 1999).  
 There is evidence across a wide range of different domains demonstrating that 
older adults consistently have more trouble with inhibition tasks than do young adults, 
(Hasher, Stolzfus, Zacks, & Rypma, 1991; Langley, Vivas, Fuentes, & Bagne, 2005), 
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and that this ability continues to decrease with advancing age (Persad, Abeles, Zacks, & 
Denburg, 2002). In studies of directed forgetting, older adults have been found to be 
poorer at suppressing irrelevant information than young adults (May, Hasher, & Kane, 
1999), and this has been demonstrated even for information where the level of 
processing was shallow, meaning forgetting should have been easier (Dulaney et al., 
2004).  
 Evidence of difficulties with inhibition has also been found in studies 
investigating how it applies to different senses. McDowd and Filion (1992) found that 
older adults showed non-differential habituation to tones they were instructed to attend 
to and ignore, unlike the younger adults who habituated more quickly to tones they were 
instructed to ignore. In a study by Valeriani, Ranghi and Giaquinto (2003) involving 
nerve stimulation, evocation of attention-related N140 potentials in a control task 
revealed that older adults were unable to ignore the stimulation even when instructed to. 
These studies suggest that the tendency for older adults to be distracted by irrelevant 
information is not confined to any one domain. This is further supported by a multitude 
of studies showing the difficulties that older adults have with visual tasks involving 
negative priming (e. g. Connelly & Hasher, 1993; McDowd & Oseaskreger, 1991). 
Of particular relevance to this study is evidence of the effects of age and 
inhibition on language and comprehension tasks. A study by Connelly, Hasher, and 
Zacks (1991) involving paragraph reading found that older adults were more slowed 
down by the presence of distractor words than were young adults. In a similar vein, a 
study of discourse comprehension by Hamm and Hasher (1992) found that older adults 
were more likely to retain both relevant and irrelevant inferences about various 
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statements in memory, whereas younger adults only maintained relevant inferences. 
This was believed to be evidence of a decline in inhibitory abilities rather than a decline 
in general working memory capacity, as the older adults should not have been able to 
maintain more inferences than younger adults if the storage capacity of their working 
memory was reduced (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Together, this empirical evidence 
suggests that declining inhibitory abilities in older adults results in their inability to 
ignore irrelevant information presented to them. That is, the excitatory mechanisms in 
their brains allow information to enter awareness, but the faulty inhibitory mechanisms 
do not enable the removal of irrelevant information. 
Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) theory of the effects of ageing on inhibition was a 
revolution in the literature, and current empirical research continues to show support. As 
described previously, a large number of studies across a wide variety of domains have 
found that older adults show decreased performance on inhibition tasks as compared to 
younger adults (e.g. Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994; McDowd, 1997; 
McDowd & Oseaskreger, 1991; Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996). Recent studies 
still show support for the theory, but are beginning to move away from the notion of 
inhibition as a unitary construct, which was the trend in the early ‘90s. (c.f. Dempster, 
1992). For instance, a study by Rush, Barch, and Braver (2006) ran an inhibition test 
battery on a sample of older and younger adults, finding both significant and non-
significant effects as well as weak inter-task correlations, indicating a selective 
inhibition mechanism. In another study by Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer 
(1994), subjects completed a number of different inhibition tasks, including the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting test, negative priming, and response compatibility. The 
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researchers found, surprisingly, that the effects were different between tasks; that is, that 
performance on one task did not predict performance on another. These studies indicate 
that inhibition may involve a number of components, which could explain why different 
measures of inhibitory abilities do not cohere very well.  However, while the construct 
of inhibition is continually being reviewed, the literature stills supports the general 
notion of Hasher and Zacks’ theory. 
Inhibition and Social Consequences 
 While much of the research on inhibition focuses on the direct cognitive effects 
it can have, the main focus of this study was to investigate the way inhibition can affect 
the social behaviour of older adults. Indeed, there are many situations where the 
differences in social behaviour between young and old adults are quite pronounced, for 
instance, when older adults make inappropriate comments, or appear to be more 
prejudiced than younger adults. While there is not a great deal of research on age-related 
inhibitory deficits and social consequences, it is believed that inhibitory abilities 
underlie many of these behaviours (e. g. Arbuckle & Pushkar Gold, 1993; von Hippel & 
Dunlop, 2005). 
 One social phenomenon influenced by inhibitory mechanisms is stereotyping 
and prejudice. Older adults are known to be more prejudiced than their younger 
counterparts (Wilson, 1996), and empirical research has revealed that the relationship 
between age and prejudice is mediated by poor inhibitory functioning (von Hippel, 
Silver, & Lynch, 2000). Interestingly, research has also found that distracting young 
adults during exposure to a target increases the likelihood that they will apply a 
stereotype to that target if the stereotype is already activated (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). 
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Thus, inhibitory losses in older adults may have the same effect as distraction in young 
adults, in that once a particular stereotype is activated, they are unable to inhibit the 
application of that stereotype. 
 Other areas shown to be influenced by inhibition are social inappropriateness 
and verbosity, two occurrences which are often associated with older age. A study by 
von Hippel and Dunlop (2005) found that even though older adults were not more likely 
than younger adults to inquire about personal issues in general, they showed less 
discrimination than younger participants between public and private settings when 
inquiring about such issues. More importantly, this effect was mediated by inhibitory 
functioning. Similarly, research has also revealed that there is a relationship between 
inhibitory functioning and off-target verbosity among older adults (Arbuckle & Pushkar 
Gold, 1993). 
While it is evident that inhibitory abilities can influence a range of different 
social behaviours, of interest to the current study is people’s belief in information 
presented to them. In studies of discourse comprehension, researchers have found that 
older adults maintain both relevant and irrelevant inferences in memory, as opposed to 
younger adults who are able to suppress inferences that are no longer important (Hamm 
& Hasher, 1992; Hartman & Hasher, 1991). In Hamm and Hasher’s study, participants 
were presented with a number of passages where some implied an ‘expected’ 
interpretation (e.g. that an artist received a call from his doctor who told him he had 
three months left to live), and others contained an ‘unexpected’ version that initially 
misled participants to believe a certain interpretation, but then reverted back to the 
original interpretation (e.g. it implied that the artist received a call from someone saying 
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he had three months left to complete a painting, but it was then revealed that it was his 
doctor calling saying he had three months to live). Participants were asked whether 
target words were consistent with their understanding of the passage half-way through 
the passage and at the end of the passage. It was found that for the unexpected passages, 
older adults were more likely than younger adults to initially accept the competing 
inference as consistent with their understanding of the passage, and then to continue to 
do so until the end of the passage. However, at the same time they were also correctly 
agreeing with the target interpretation 88% of the time. These results indicated that 
unlike younger adults, older adults were maintaining both inferences in working 
memory, implying that they were unable to inhibit the no longer relevant inference.  
Employing a slightly different design to Hamm and Hasher, a study by Hartman 
and Hasher (1991) investigated the effects of inhibition on a language priming task. 
Participants were required to finish predictable sentences, e.g. ‘She ladled the soup into 
her ___’ (bowl), and then remember an unexpected ending, e.g. ‘lap’. As expected, in a 
subsequent implicit memory test involving completion of new sentence fragments, older 
adults showed priming to both the target and distractor words, whereas younger adults 
showed priming only for the distractor words. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that older adults find it difficult to inhibit no-longer relevant information. 
 As both of the above studies show evidence of the influence of inhibitory deficits 
on older adults’ inferences about arbitrary information, it was thought that perhaps this 
effect could also extend to real-life circumstances and information that may be 
encountered in day-to-day activities. That is, if older adults were presented with certain 
information, and were then provided with cues that indicated that some parts of the 
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information were false or misleading (just as the ‘unexpected’ interpretation implied the 
‘expected’ interpretation was no longer relevant in the discourse comprehension task), 
then they may not be able to inhibit those pieces of information. Furthermore, they may 
integrate the false statements into their inferences made about the information, which 
could potentially have serious consequences in a real-life situation.  
An example of such information may be that presented by a salesperson about a 
particular product, or an article in a magazine. Every day we encounter information 
from a number of different sources, and it seems plausible that if older adults experience 
difficulties inhibiting arbitrary pieces of information that are irrelevant, they may also 
face the same difficulties with information that is more personally significant. For 
instance, older adults may have difficulty inhibiting the fantastic claims a salesperson is 
making about a product that someone else has said is a waste of money. While this type 
of information has not been explored in the literature on inhibition and ageing, relevant 
research has been conducted on the way we believe information, and also the way we 
unbelieve information. Perhaps this related research can be combined with the research 
on ageing, inhibition and the maintenance of no-longer-relevant information to create a 
useful, testable theory proposing that older adults may be more likely to believe false or 
misleading information, ultimately making them more susceptible to fraud. 
 Research on the way people believe and unbelieve information has been 
conducted by Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone (1993). In this paper, the researchers tested 
an age-old argument regarding comprehension and belief. According to Descartes, 
people are able to comprehend assertions without believing them; however according to 
Spinoza, comprehension and belief are one and the same, and a separate process is 
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required to ‘unbelieve’ information that has been read and understood. In the study, 
participants were required to read a fictional crime report that was interspersed with 
another irrelevant report. When reading statements belonging to the irrelevant report, 
some participants were distracted with a number task or were put under time pressure. 
The findings revealed that these ‘distraction’ conditions caused participants to believe 
the irrelevant information, which influenced their guilt judgements of the criminal. It 
appeared that the distraction prevented the participants from inhibiting, or disregarding, 
the false information that was initially believed during comprehension. The relevance of 
this study to the current study is that it was thought that similar effects might be 
observed in older adults, but that it would be the result of their age-related inhibitory 
deficits, rather than distraction. That is, their inhibitory deficits would mimic the effect 
of distraction in these comprehension tasks. 
 The exact processes thought to underlie the actions of believing and unbelieving 
are clarified in an earlier paper by Gilbert (1991), who reviewed the literature on 
comprehension and belief. He described the ‘Spinozan’ process of comprehension, 
starting with the ‘Representation’ stage, where both comprehension and acceptance 
occur together. This is followed by the ‘Assessment’ stage, where belief is followed by 
either certification or unacceptance, and not the other way around (i.e. non-belief 
followed by acceptance) (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). The ‘Assessment’ stage is 
thought to involve relating the comprehended information to other information that 
already exists within one’s knowledge. For instance, if someone states that all 
armadillos have four legs, one would initially believe this assertion before ‘unbelieving’ 
it, when compared to their knowledge that they have a five-legged pet armadillo sitting 
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at home. Of course, this example seems somewhat inane, but it clearly encapsulates the 
Spinozan procedure.  
For purpose of the current study, it is hypothesised that perhaps the ‘Assessment’ 
stage could also involve comparison of the initial information to existing knowledge that 
does not necessarily falsify the initial claims, but raises suspicion or doubt about their 
accuracy. For example, one may initially believe a salesman’s claims that his vacuum 
cleaner is the best on the market, but may then unbelieve these statements when the poor 
state of the salesman’s clothes and appearance indicates that perhaps his product is not 
selling so well, or if the product itself looks questionable. It is thought that if inhibitory 
deficits in older adults cause them to be unable to inhibit false or suspicious information 
that was initially believed, this information might remain in working memory, thereby 
exerting an influence on belief, despite intentions to the contrary. Indeed, Gilbert (1991) 
proposed that when the Spinozan ‘Assessment’ mechanism is disabled in a person (e.g. 
as the result of distraction), it results in that person’s belief in the comprehended 
proposition. Thus while older adults’ ‘Assessment’ mechanism might not be disabled 
per se, it may be faulty in that it cannot consequently delete the previously believed 
information from memory, thus increasing the chance that it is later recalled as a true 
account of events. 
While the link between unbelieving and distraction has been made clear by 
Gilbert’s research, the theory that age-related inhibitory losses could have the same 
effect as distraction on unbelieving is based on two related, but as yet unmarried 
concepts in cognitive psychology. However, it is believed that the previously presented 
evidence on inhibition, belief, and the maintenance of no-longer-relevant information 
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shows support for the hypothesis that older adults’ inhibitory abilities may control the 
process of unbelieving. Gilbert et al. (1993) proposed that when we comprehend 
information, we initially believe it before we are able to ‘unbelieve’ it, and found that 
distracting people caused them to be unable to perform this second cognitive action, 
which resulted in them believing false information. The critical finding here is that 
participants were not able to perform the cognitive action of unbelieving the false 
information, as a similar effect was found in Hamm and Hasher’s (1992) study of older 
adults where they were unable to inhibit information that had already been activated. 
Thus, in situations where older adults are presented with suspicious or misleading 
information, they may initially believe it and have it activated in their minds (Gilbert et 
al., 1993), but their inhibitory deficits may be unable to inhibit and delete that 
information from memory (Hamm & Hasher, 1992). Thus, inhibitory abilities may 
directly relate to the process of unbelieving. It is interesting to note here, as mentioned 
earlier, that inhibitory deficits in older adults and distraction in young adults have both 
led to the application of activated stereotypes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; von Hippel et al., 
2000), so it may be logical to suppose that a similar effect may be found with belief in 
false information. 
Studies investigating persuasion also provide support for the above theory. In a 
review of the literature on distraction and persuasion, Baron, Baron, and Miller (1973) 
found that across a large number of studies, participants who were distracted while 
being exposed to a persuasive message were more likely to be persuaded. One proposed 
explanation for these findings was that distraction prevented the process of counter-
arguing from occurring; however, a slightly different interpretation is that distracted 
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participants were able to counter-argue, but, as in Gilbert’s studies, were not able to 
inhibit the initial claim, thus making them more susceptible to persuasion. The relevance 
of this for the current study is that the effects of age-related inhibitory losses may equate 
to the use of distraction tasks. That is, when presented with persuasive information, 
older adults may be able to counter-argue, but may not be able to inhibit the initial 
claim. Thus, both the counter-argument and the initial claim may remain active in 
memory, making them more susceptible to persuasion. 
 Thus, taken together, research in the areas of inhibition, maintenance of no-
longer-relevant information, belief and persuasion all provide support for the theory that 
age-related inhibitory losses could function in the same way as distraction in situations 
where the veracity of persuasive information is doubtful, leading to increased likelihood 
that the information will be believed. In a real-life setting, this may have serious 
implications for older adults. As mentioned earlier, fraud is the most common of all 
crimes committed against older adults (Muscat et al., 2002), and it is believed that it 
may be partly due to the influence of inhibitory deficits on their belief of information 
presented to them. 
Aims and hypotheses 
 The aim of the present study was to further explore the influence of inhibition on 
how information is comprehended and believed. To do so, it expanded on two related, 
but as yet empirically unlinked theories, these being Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) theory of 
inhibition and ageing, and Gilbert’s (1991) Spinozan theory of comprehension and 
belief. The aim was to investigate whether declines in inhibitory functioning could also 
explain the way older people comprehend and believe information.  
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The first hypothesis predicted that, similar to previous findings, older adults 
would show decreased performance on measures of inhibitory functioning than younger 
adults. Furthermore, it was also predicted that that older adults would maintain more 
inferences of a suspicious nature in working memory than younger adults. While they 
may be equally suspicious of the information (or information source) as younger adults, 
the larger number of suspicious inferences available in working memory may increase 
their chances of later recalling that information as a true account of events. In addition, 
it was expected that inhibitory deficits would mediate the relationship between age and 
number of suspicious inferences maintained. The third hypothesis predicted that 
Gilbert’s (1993) results would be expanded upon, in that age would function as a 
distractor, causing older adults to be unable to inhibit false information, thus 
incorporating it into their understanding of events. More specifically, in instances where 
false information appeared to increase or lessen the guilt of a criminal target, older 
adults would incorporate this false information into their judgements of the target. 
Furthermore, the relationship between age and false belief was also expected to be 
mediated by inhibitory deficits.  
 To investigate these hypotheses, participants completed two tasks involving 
information that was suspicious or false. In one task, the veracity of the information was 
stated explicitly; however in the other task, the veracity of some of the information was 
inferred from cues that were provided at the beginning of the task. Participants were 
required to read the information and then answer questions regarding their inferences 
about it. In the task containing suspicious information, an implicit memory test was also 
used to measure what information was still available in working memory. If the 
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suspicious information was still available, this might have a greater impact on 
judgement. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 40 older adults (M = 72.2 years, SD = 6.17, range = 62-
84), and 40 younger adults (M = 19.38 years, SD = 1.81, range = 17-25). The older adult 
group comprised of 29 females and 11 males, and the younger adult group included 30 
females and 10 males. The older participants were recruited via the 50+ Registry from 
the Australasian Centre on Ageing at the University of Queensland, and also through 
personal contacts. The younger participants were recruited from several on-campus 
residential colleges at the University of Queensland. Participants were informed that the 
study was investigating ‘impression formation’ in older adults as compared to younger 
adults, and were reimbursed with $20 in exchange for participation. 
Materials 
To assess inhibitory abilities, three different measures of inhibition were used. 
The first was the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which involves presenting participants with 
a list of colour words that are printed in a different coloured ink (e.g. the word ‘yellow’ 
printed in blue ink). Participants are required to name the colour of the ink and avoid 
saying the word itself. A baseline reading time was recorded in which participants 
simply named block colours to control for speed of colour labelling. The Stroop test was 
used in this study as it has been validated across many populations (including older 
adults) as a good measure of inhibition (Dempster, 1992). In this study, errors in the 
incongruent condition were also recorded to check for any patterns indicating that faster 
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times were associated with a large number of incorrect answers. See Appendix A for a 
copy of the materials. 
 The second measure of inhibition was a paragraph reading task created by 
Connelly et al. (1991). To measure inhibitory ability in this task, participants were timed 
while they read italicised paragraphs aloud. In some paragraphs, the italicised words 
were mixed with normal font words; however participants had to ignore these and read 
only the italicised words. As we tend to scan ahead when we read, this meant 
participants had to inhibit vocalisation of the distracting words once they were encoded. 
This measure was chosen as it has also been found to be a good measure of inhibition in 
older adults (Connelly et al., 1991). The task was programmed into a computer program 
called DirectRT, and was administered on a laptop. See Appendix B for a copy of the 
materials. 
 The third measure of inhibition was a sentence span task designed to measure 
working memory, which appears to have a clear inhibitory component (Lustig, May, & 
Hasher, 2001). Working memory is of particular relevance to this study, as it taps the 
deletion function of inhibition, and the current experiment requires participants to delete 
dubious information from working memory. Participants were presented with a string of 
sentences, and were required to read them out loud and remember the last word of each 
of the sentences. The first level of the task began with a two-sentence string, and two 
trials of this level and each subsequent level were presented until participants reached 
the five-sentence level. Trials were discontinued once a participant did not get any trials 
for a particular level correct. The task was programmed into DirectRT, and was 
administered on a laptop. See Appendix C for a copy of the materials. 
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In order to measure belief in false or suspicious information, two separate tasks 
were used. The first task was adapted from one used in Gilbert’s (1993) study on 
comprehension and belief. In this task, participants read aloud a crime report about a 
man who had mugged a lady to steal her bag, and later made guilt judgements about the 
criminal. The crime report was interspersed with another report that participants had 
been instructed to read and understand, but that they did not need to make a guilt 
judgement about. The timing was self-paced. For half of the participants, the intertwined 
statements would exacerbate the severity of the crime if confused for the primary report, 
and for the other half of the participants, the intertwined statements would lessen or 
attenuate the severity of the crime. At the end of the crime report, participants were 
asked several questions about their impressions of the case that they were required to 
make a guilt judgement about. Participants were asked to complete six 9-point scales 
that measured (a) whether they would recommend the maximum or minimum sentence 
allowed by law for this crime (anchored at the extremes with minimum and maximum),
(b) what their feelings were towards the attacker (i.e. indicating his dislikeableness) 
(ranging from very negative to very positive), (c) how dangerous they believed the 
attacker to be (ranging from not at all dangerous to very dangerous), (d) their rating of 
the attacker’s personality  (ranging from hostile to friendly), and (e) whether they 
perceived the cause of the attacker’s behaviour to be a deviant personality or unfortunate 
circumstances (anchored at the extremes by these two phrases respectively). The task 
was programmed into a computer program called Media Lab, and was administered on a 
laptop. See Appendix D for a copy of the materials. 
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The second task was also programmed into Media Lab, and required participants 
to read a story about a student buying a car. At the beginning of the story, it was evident 
that the salesman’s intentions about finding the best car for the student were suspicious. 
Rather, it gave the impression that he would say anything just to sell a car. Participants 
were told to read the task on the laptop at their own pace; however each statement was 
timed so that the ‘Continue’ button would not appear for two seconds. This ensured that 
participants could not skip reading the statements by pressing ‘Continue’ repeatedly. 
 The main measures of the task were word completion tasks interspersed 
throughout the story in which participants were shown a list of 6 word prefixes. Half of 
the prefixes were the beginning of test words, and half the prefixes were completable 
stems that couldn’t be solved with words from the story. Test words were words that 
appeared throughout the story. There were 30 of these in total in the story, and they were 
separated into groups of 10. Twenty of the 30 test words were ‘target’ words, which 
were words that should have been activated in the minds of the participants, depending 
on their belief in what the salesman was saying. For example, if the student complained 
there was a ‘crack’ on the windscreen, and the salesman argued that it was just a ‘mark’, 
then ‘crack’ should be activated in the minds of those who believed what the student is 
saying, and ‘mark’ should be activated in the minds of those who believed the salesman, 
or in this case, those who could not inhibit the salesman’s claims (Gilbert et al., 1993). 
Half of the 20 target words were words said by the student that related to the poor 
quality of the car, and the other half were words said by the salesman that related to the 
‘good’ quality of the car. The other 10 test words were neutral words that appeared in 
the story (e.g. street, ladies) that weren’t generated by either schema of the car’s quality, 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         21
and served as control words. In order to prevent participants from immediately 
recognising words from the story and guessing the true purpose of the word puzzles, the 
puzzles were ordered such that the first prefix in each one was a non-test word. 
Furthermore, the puzzles were arranged so that they appeared an equal amount of times 
following statements made by the student and statements made by the salesman. This 
prevented any response bias due to the ease with which more recently read words could 
be brought to mind. 
 When participants were shown each list of prefixes at the 10 different points in 
the story, they were required to generate two words that came to mind. Participants were 
required to say these words out loud to counter any tendency to produce shorter words 
had it been a written measure (i.e. writing short words is much easier than writing long 
words, but this is not a problem if words are said out loud). 
 At the end of the task, in order to complete the ‘cover story’ that the task was 
about ‘impression formation’, participants were presented with questions regarding the 
quality of the car, and the intentions of the salesman. These were rated on a 9-point 
scales, and measured (a) how reliable they believed the car was (ranging from very 
unreliable to very reliable), (b) what they thought about the quality of the car (ranging 
from very low quality to very high quality), (c) how much they thought the salesman 
wanted to make money (ranging from not at all to a great deal), and (d) how much they 
thought the salesman cared about finding the best car for the student (ranging from 
didn’t care at all to cared a lot). Participants selected their answer by pressing the 
appropriate number on the keyboard. See Appendix E for a copy of the measure and 
questions. 
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One measure of cognitive function, the Mini-Mental Status Exam (MMSE), was 
also used in the study (Kukull et al., 1994). It assesses functions such as short-term 
memory, orientation, and attention and calculation. It was only completed by the older 
adults, and was included to ensure that they did not show signs of dementia, as the study 
was interested in the naturally declining inhibitory abilities of older adults. See 
Appendix F for a copy of the materials. 
 The final measure included in the study was a measure of speed of processing 
(Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Both younger and older participants completed this task, 
which required them to identify as quickly as possible if two patterns on the screen were 
the same or different by pressing the ‘E’ (different) and ‘I’ (same) keys on the keyboard. 
This measure was included to assess the possibility that the results in the study were 
mediated by the speed of processing of the participants, rather than inhibitory abilities. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested either at their location of residence or at the University 
of Queensland, and all participants were tested individually. After reading the study 
information sheet, participants provided informed consent and filled out a basic 
demographic survey (e.g. age, gender) (see Appendix G for a copy of these materials). 
Questions regarding history of head injuries or stroke were included to account for any 
possible influence on cognitive abilities. Participants were told the study was 
investigating how people form impressions of others in a range of different situations 
and with different pieces of information. 
 The first task given to participants was the salesman task. Participants were told 
that the research was interested in real-life situations with a number of different 
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distractions, and that in the task they would be reading a story about a student buying a 
car. They were told that throughout the story some word puzzles would be shown as 
distractors, and that they had to say, out loud, two words that came to mind for each 
prefix. If they had trouble coming up with two, participants were told they could just say 
one. Participants’ responses were recorded. At the end of the task, participants rated 
their impressions of the car and the salesman on the response scale presented to them on 
the laptop. 
 Participants then completed the Stroop task, followed by the Connelly paragraph 
task. The inclusion of distractors in each of the four paragraphs in the Connelly task was 
counterbalanced, such that for half of the participants, paragraphs 1 and 3 included 
distractors (and 2 and 4 did not), and vice versa for the other half of the participants. 
 The next task participants completed was the crime report task measuring false 
belief. The attenuating vs. exacerbating conditions were counterbalanced. Participants 
were given the following instructions: “This next task involves you reading a fictional 
crime report. Now, police have many demands on time and attention, and one problem 
they face is trying to keep two stories straight. We’re interested in how this works. What 
you need to do is imagine you’re the staff sergeant trying to figure out how a crime was 
committed, and you’ve got all these people telling you different things. So, in this task, 
what you’re going to see is ONE case that you have to make a guilt judgement on, and 
ANOTHER case that’s been intertwined with it. So we need you to read and remember 
them both, but you’ll only be making a guilt judgement about one of them, so focus your 
attention on that one. The case you need to decide on is in black, and the other 
intertwined case is in red.” Participants were then taken through a practice phase that 
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comprised of two black statements and two red statements to ensure they understood the 
task, and the test phase of the experiment began following this. 
 Participants then completed the working memory task and the speed test. Young 
participants finished testing at this point, as they were not required to complete the final 
measure. Following the speed test, the older participants then completed the MMSE, 
which the experimenter guided them through. Following completion of the study, 
participants were reimbursed with $20 and thanked for their time. 
Contributions 
 The design of the study was conducted jointly by myself and my supervisor, 
Prof. Bill von Hippel. I was responsible for writing the stories used in the two tasks we 
designed, as well as programming these tasks into Media Lab. I recruited and tested all 
participants, which included liaising with the Australasian Centre on Ageing to access 
their 50+ Registry. I was responsible for all data entry, and Prof. Bill von Hippel helped 
me to conduct the appropriate statistical analyses. 
Results 
 
Demographics 
Of the younger adults, all had completed high school and were completing 
tertiary degrees (if they had not already completed one). Of the 39 older adults who gave 
education information, 25 had obtained tertiary qualifications, 9 had completed high 
school, and 5 had graduated from primary school. Nine of the older adults and one of the 
younger adults had experienced a small stroke or head injury; however all had been 
informed that their mental functioning was not significantly affected. 
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Preliminary Analyses 
 Prior to analyses, raw data were screened for accuracy of data entry, missing 
values, outliers and to evaluate the assumptions of multivariate analysis. While several 
missing values (less than 5%) were found, these were randomly dispersed among 
variables, so the cases were retained for analysis. Two univariate outliers were identified 
in the younger adults sample due to their extremely slow reading times on the Connelly 
paragraphs task. As this was evidence of both participants’ difficulty with speaking 
English, both were omitted from all analyses. Two older adults were also identified as 
univariate outliers due to their extremely slow reaction times on the majority of the 
executive functioning tasks. These cases were retained for analyses; however their 
scores on the executive functioning tasks were omitted. This led to an overall sample 
size of 78, and a reduced sample size of 76 for the executive functioning measures. No 
multivariate outliers were detected. 
 Several of the executive functioning measures were found to be positively 
skewed, these being the Stroop task, the Connelly paragraphs, and the speed task. A 
logarithmic transformation was applied to all of these variables to reduce skewness and 
kurtosis, and to improve normality and linearity; however a subsequent analysis using 
the transformed data found the results to be minimally different from the untransformed 
data (see Appendix H for output), so the untransformed data were used in the final 
analysis and interpretation. The assumptions of linearity and normality were met for the 
other variables. All statistical tests were analysed using an alpha level of .05. As the 
study was the first to investigate this particular topic, no power analysis could be 
conducted as effect sizes could not be determined. 
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Inhibitory Functioning 
 In order to determine levels of inhibitory ability, participants were required to 
complete several measures of executive functioning including the Stroop task, the 
Connelly paragraph reading task, and a working memory task. A speeded judgement 
task was also included to control for participants’ speed of processing, and the MMSE 
was included to control for possible effects of dementia. It was expected that older 
adults would perform more poorly than young adults on all of these tasks; that is, that 
significant relationships would be found between age and task performance. These 
relationships would be positive or negative depending on whether they were speed-
based (where higher scores indicated poorer performance) or performance based (where 
lower scores indicated poorer performance). To ascertain this, correlations between age 
and participants’ scores on each measure were obtained. 
To operationalise level of inhibitory functioning, the raw Stroop task scores were 
transformed into single scores by subtracting the block time (the baseline measure of 
colour naming) from the word time (where participants were required to ignore the word 
meaning and name the ink colour), and dividing this by the block time. This converted 
raw values into ratio scores to minimise the impact of speed, which differs dramatically 
between old and young adults. As predicted, a significant positive correlation was found 
between age and relative disruption in the Stroop task, r(73) = .70, p<.01. This indicated 
that as age increased, inhibitory functioning decreased. 
 Inhibitory functioning in the Connelly task was measured by subtracting scores 
in the ‘normal’ text condition from scores in the ‘distracting’ text condition, and 
dividing by the ‘normal’ text score. As predicted, a significant positive correlation was 
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found between age and relative disruption in the reading task r(72) = .49, p<.01. This 
indicated that as age increased, so too did the disruption to reading time caused by the 
distracting text.  
 Scores for the working memory task were calculated by counting the number of 
trials where all words were correctly recalled. Lower scores indicated poorer executive 
functioning. As predicted, a significant negative correlation was found between age and 
working memory score, r(76) = -.48, p<.01. This indicated that as age increased, 
participants’ working memory span decreased. 
 Scores for the speed task were calculated as the average response time for trials 
that were correct. Poorer performance was indicated by longer response times. As 
predicted, a significant positive relationship was found between age and average 
response time, r(75) = .69, p<.01. This indicated that as age increased, average response 
times also increased. 
 Level of cognitive functioning in the MMSE was measured by calculating the 
total number of items that were correct. Poorer performance was indicated by lower 
scores. As predicted, a significant negative relationship was found between age and 
MMSE scores, r(38) = -.51, p<.01. This indicated that as age increased, cognitive 
functioning decreased. 
 To assess the inter-relationships of the cognitive measures within the current 
sample, zero-order inter-task correlations were also obtained. These correlations are 
outlined in Table 1. It was revealed that all of the measures of executive functioning 
were moderately correlated with each other, indicating that in the current sample, the 
measures appeared to be tapping a common executive functioning component. Working 
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memory was the only inhibitory functioning measure significantly correlated with the 
MMSE.  
 In order to verify that the inter-correlations of the executive functioning 
measures were not just a function of age, partial correlation coefficients controlling for 
age were also obtained. These correlations are reported in Table 2. Only the correlation 
between the Stroop and the Connelly task was still significant, indicating that if age was 
held constant, performance on most tasks did not predict performance on the others. 
This indicated that apart from the Stroop test and Connelly paragraphs, the tasks may 
have been measuring separate aspects of executive functioning. Indeed, this finding is 
consistent with Kramer et al. (1994), who found that performance on various executive 
functioning tasks did not predict performance on others. 
Table 1 
Inter-Correlations of Stroop, Connelly Paragraphs, Working Memory, Speed Test, and  
 
MMSE Scores. 
Executive 
Functioning Task 
Stroop Connelly 
paragraphs 
Working 
memory 
Speed MMSE 
Stroop -- -- -- -- -- 
Connelly paragraphs .620** -- -- -- -- 
Working memory -.386* -.376* -- -- -- 
Speed .578** .373* -.292* -- -- 
MMSE -.223 -.150 .359* -.198 -- 
* = p<.05 ** = p<.01 
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Table 2 
Inter-Correlations of Stroop, Connelly Paragraphs, Working Memory, and Speed Test  
 
Scores, Controlling for Age in Years. 
 
Executive 
Functioning Task 
Stroop Connelly 
paragraphs 
Working 
memory 
Speed 
Stroop -- -- -- -- 
Connelly paragraphs .447** -- -- -- 
Working memory -.111 -.214 -- -- 
Speed .194 .054 .146 -- 
* = p<.05 ** = p<.01 
Word Completion Task - Manipulation Check 
 After reading a suspicious story, subject were required to rate their opinions of 
the salesman and the car itself. As it was intended for both young and old adults to be 
suspicious of the salesman, no differences in opinions were expected between these two 
groups. Subjects’ opinion ratings were submitted to a one-way multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) with age as the independent variable with two levels (young and 
old) and ratings of the car’s quality and reliability, how much the salesman wanted to 
make money and how much he wanted to help the student as the four dependent 
variables. As expected, no multivariate effect of age was found, F(4,73) = 1.50, p=.21. 
As Table 3 shows, younger and older adults both believed the car to be of poor quality 
and reliability, and that the salesman wished to make money and did not care much 
about helping the student. 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of the Car and the Salesman as a Function  
 
of Age Group. 
Age group 
Young (n = 38) Old (n = 40) 
Reliability of car 2.03 (1.82) 
 
1.43 (1.24) 
Quality of car 
 
1.68 (0.93) 
 
1.40 (0.90) 
How much salesman 
wanted to make money 
8.58  (0.76) 
 
8.23 (1.94) 
How much salesman 
wanted to help 
1.66 (1.48) 1.25 (0.74) 
Note: Standard deviations shown in parentheses 
Word Completion Task Scores 
Throughout the previously mentioned suspicious story, participants were 
periodically required to generate words from letter strings, some of which were prefixes 
of words describing apparently truthful statements, apparently untruthful (suspicious) 
statements, or neutral statements from the story. It was expected that older adults would 
be unable to inhibit the ‘suspicious’ claims made in the story, and would thus generate 
more apparently untruthful words than younger adults. No differences were expected for 
apparently truthful or neutral words. Participants received three scores in this task: the 
number of apparently untruthful, apparently truthful, and neutral words they generated 
throughout the task. Target responses included both the exact word that appeared in the 
story, and any slight variations of those words, as these were also believed to indicate 
activation of the thought brought about by the target word. For instance, for the word 
‘slippery’, the word ‘slip’ was accepted, as was the word ‘shake’ for ‘shaky’. 
 Word scores in the word completion task were submitted to a one-way 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with age as the independent variable with 
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two levels (young and old) and apparently untruthful words, apparently truthful words, 
and neutral words as the three dependent variables. Using Wilks’ criterion, the analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of age group on the combined dependent variables, 
indicating that the overall number of words generated was significantly affected by age, 
F(3,74) = 3.11, p = .03, /p2 = .11. The univariate F-tests for each DV were then 
evaluated, revealing significant univariate main effects for apparently untruthful words 
F(1,76) = 5.20, p=.03, /p2 = .06, apparently truthful words, F(1,76) = 4.72, p=.03, /p2 =
.06, and neutral words, F(1,76) = 4.10, p<.05. /p2 = .05. Inspection of the marginal 
means for each dependent variable indicated that contrary to the hypothesis, younger 
adults generated significantly more words of each type than older adults (see Table 4). 
This finding contradicted the prediction that older adults would generate more 
apparently untruthful target words than younger adults, as younger adults were not 
expected to show increased activation over all three word types. 
Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Apparently Untruthful, Apparently Truthful, and  
 
Neutral Word Scores as a Function of Age Group. 
 
Age group 
Word type Young (n = 38) Old (n = 40) 
Apparently 
untruthful 
2.97 (1.24) 2.33 (1.27) 
Apparently 
truthful 
3.16 (1.62) 2.38 (1.56) 
Neutral 2.18 (1.37) 1.63 (1.06) 
Note: Standard deviations shown in parentheses 
Prison Terms and Other Ratings 
Subjects read aloud a crime report containing false statements that either 
exacerbated or attenuated the severity of the crime. It was expected that older adults 
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would be unable to inhibit these false statements, which would influence their 
recommended prison terms and other judgements regarding the criminal. Subjects’ 
recommended prison terms, ratings of the criminal’s dangerousness, hostility, 
responsibility for the crime, and their feelings towards him were submitted to a 2 (age: 
young or old) x 2 (false statements: exacerbating or attenuating) MANOVA. The 
analysis revealed a significant age x false statements interaction, F(5,70) = 3.54, p<.01, 
/p2 = .20, which was followed up by assessing the two main multivariate effects. There 
was a main effect of false statements, F(5,70) = 2.35, p<.05, /p2 = .14, however no 
significant main effect of age was found, F(5, 70) = 2.21, p=.06, /p2 = .14. 
Univariate F tests for the five dependent variables were then evaluated to assess 
which of these were driving the multivariate effect of false statements and the 
interaction. For the multivariate effect of false statements, significant univariate main 
effects were found for hostility, F(1,74) = 4.34, p=.04, /p2 = .06, prison terms, F(1,74) = 
10.49, p<.01, /p2 = .12, and responsibility for attack, F(1,74) = 5.30, p=.02, /p2 = .07. 
Examination of the cell means (Table 5) indicated that in the attenuating condition, the 
criminal was rated as more hostile, deserving of a more severe prison sentence, and 
more personally responsible for the crime than in the exacerbating condition.  
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Prison Terms and Other Ratings as a Function of  
 
Age Group and False Statement Types. 
False Statements  
Exacerbating  Attenuating 
 Younger  
(n = 18) 
Older  
(n = 20) 
 Younger  
(n = 20) 
Older  
(n = 20) 
Prison term 
 
3.39 (1.58) 5.05 (2.14)  6.55 (2.01) 5.10 (2.79) 
Dangerousness 
 
4.28 (1.99) 6.00 (2.34)  7.10 (1.37) 5.10 (2.83) 
Feelings towards 
criminal* 
3.28 (1.18) 2.05 (1.54)  2.55 (1.61) 1.85 (1.23) 
Hostility* 
 
3.67 (1.28) 2.85 (2.06)  2.45 (1.10) 2.60 (1.57) 
Responsibility for 
crime* 
5.44 (2.06) 4.60 (2.06)  3.50 (2.07) 4.35 (2.21) 
Note: Standard deviations shown in parentheses 
* Reverse scored (i.e. lower score = higher hostility, more responsibility for crime, more negativity 
towards criminal) 
 
For the age x false statements interaction, significant univariate main effects 
were found for dangerousness (F(1,74) = 13.89, p<.01) and prison terms (F(1,74) = 
9.84, p<.01). Inspection of the cell means indicated that the false statements conditions 
influenced prison terms and dangerousness ratings, but only for young adults (see 
Figures 1 and 2). That is, while older adults gave similar prison terms and 
dangerousness ratings in both the exacerbating and attenuating conditions, younger 
adults rated the criminal in the exacerbating condition as less dangerous and deserving 
of a lighter sentence than the criminal in the attenuating condition. While this did not 
correspond exactly with the prediction that older adults’ judgements would be affected, 
it still indicated a difference between the judgements of older and younger adults. 
Indeed, it demonstrated that younger adults were not only able to inhibit the false 
information, but actually over-corrected for it, whereas older adults did not show this.  
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Figure 2. Dangerousness ratings for exacerbating and attenuating false statement  
 
conditions for young and old adults. 
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Figure 1. Prison term ratings for exacerbating and attenuating false statement  
 
conditions for young and old adults. 
To ensure the effects were not simply due to poor general cognitive functioning, 
the same analyses were run excluding subjects with MMSE scores below 27, as this is 
the cut-off commonly used to exclude people with dementia (Kukull et al., 1994). The 
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same pattern of results was found (see Appendix I), indicating the presence of a 
significant age effect that was not due to poor overall cognitive functioning. 
Mediation Analysis 
As the ratings of prison terms and dangerousness were the only significant 
Univariate effects in the interaction between age and false statement type, scores on 
these variables were further investigated with regression analyses to test whether they 
were mediated by inhibitory functioning, as was predicted. Several multiple regressions 
were conducted with the different executive functioning task scores and age as the 
predictor variables, and prison terms and dangerousness scores as criterion variables. 
The regression analyses first tested for each individual mediator (the Stroop task, 
Connelly paragraphs, and working memory), and then tested whether a composite 
measure of executive functioning was a mediator (this was made up of the measures that 
correlated after controlling for age, these being the Stroop and Connelly tasks). Another 
regression analysis was then run with speed task scores to assess whether processing 
speed was a mediator. However, contrary to what was predicted, none of the analyses 
revealed any indication that the interaction between age and false statement type was 
mediated by inhibitory dysfunction or speed (see Appendix J for output). 
 Discussion 
 The present thesis investigated the effects of age-related inhibitory losses on 
belief in false and suspicious information. It was predicted that an association between 
the two may influence older adults’ susceptibility to fraud and deception. Consistent 
with the first hypothesis, the preliminary findings revealed that older adults performed 
more poorly on the measures of executive functioning than younger adults. This was 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief 36
indicative of deficits in their inhibitory functioning relative to younger adults, providing 
support for Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) theory that ageing is associated with a decline in 
inhibitory processes. This finding also corresponded with the multitude of research 
showing that older adults consistently perform more poorly than younger adults on the 
particular executive functioning measures utilised in the current study (c.f. Dempster, 
1992; Langley et al., 2005). 
 While not a separate hypothesis, inter-task correlations between the executive 
functioning measures were also examined to assess the extent to which they measured a 
common component of inhibition. However, after controlling for age, only one of the 
three possible inter-task relationships was significant. Namely, scores on the Stroop task 
and the Connelly paragraphs task were significantly correlated. Thus, the tasks may not 
have all been measuring the same subset of inhibition, corresponding with past research 
suggesting that inhibition is not a unitary construct, as previously believed (Kramer et 
al., 1994; Rush et al., 2006). 
 As indicated by the second hypothesis of the study, older adults were expected to 
be unable to inhibit the apparently untruthful claims made by the salesman in the story. 
Thus, they were expected to generate more words representing these claims than 
younger adults. Accordingly, no differences were expected between young and old 
participants for apparently truthful or neutral words. However, contrary to predictions, 
younger adults generated significantly more of each type of word than older adults. 
Furthermore, this did not replicate the findings of Hamm and Hasher (1992), or 
correspond with the predictions based on the integration of Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) 
model and Gilbert’s (1991) theory of comprehension and belief. While not a separate 
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hypothesis, the manipulation check revealed older and younger adults were equally 
suspicious of the salesman and believed the car to be of equally poor quality, indicating 
that the passage at the beginning of the story successfully created the intended 
atmosphere for the task. 
 The third hypothesis of this study was that older adults would not be able to 
inhibit false statements they were explicitly instructed to ignore in a fictional crime 
report they read. As a result, their judgements of the criminal were expected to be biased 
towards the false statement condition to which they were assigned. However, while the 
findings revealed an effect, it was not completely in concordance with predictions. The 
results revealed a significant interaction between age and false statement condition, 
whereby older adults’ ratings of the criminal in both the exacerbating and attenuating 
conditions did not differ significantly from each other, whereas younger adults rated the 
criminal in the exacerbating condition as less dangerous and deserving of a lighter 
sentence than the criminal in the attenuating condition. This did not support the 
predictions based on the combination of Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) model and Gilbert et 
al.’s (1993) findings that distraction caused participants to incorporate false information 
into their judgements of a criminal. While the specific predictions of the hypothesis 
were not supported, a differential judgement effect was still observed between older and 
younger adults. This warranted further investigation to determine whether inhibitory 
functioning mediated the relationship. 
 The fourth hypothesis investigated whether the unexpected interaction between 
age and false statement type was mediated by inhibitory deficits. As hypothesis two was 
not supported by the results, there was no need to investigate the role of inhibitory 
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functioning in this instance. Contrary to predictions, the analyses revealed no indication 
that scores on any of the inhibitory functioning measures mediated the interaction 
between age and false statement type. A composite measure comprising scores on the 
Stroop and Connelly tasks (the two measures that correlated after controlling for age) 
also failed to predict judgements in the crime task, as did the speed task. This suggests 
that the observed effect was not influenced by inhibitory functioning or speed of 
processing. Thus, the data failed to support previous findings that inhibition mediates 
various social behaviours (von Hippel & Dunlop, 2005; von Hippel et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, it did not show support for the current theory based on Hasher and Zacks’ 
(1988) model and Gilbert’s (1991) theory of comprehension and belief. 
 With the lack of support for several predictions and some unexpected findings, 
theoretical and methodological explanations will now be considered to clarify the issues 
presented. First, younger adults were observed to generate more words overall than 
older adults, indicating that perhaps inhibition was not an influential factor in this 
particular task. In this case, the results observed may be interpreted simply as younger 
adults’ increased ability to recall words from the passage relative to older adults. 
However, this assumption is flawed for several reasons. Firstly, the suggestion that the 
findings reflect an effect of memory is spurious, as the design of the task was such that 
the influence of memory differences between older and younger adults would be 
prevented. More specifically, participants were informed that the purpose of the word 
completion tasks was to momentarily distract them from the story. Thus, participants 
were not instructed to, nor was there any need or indication to make a conscious effort 
to remember words from the story. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the findings of 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         39
numerous studies on inhibitory functioning suggest that the capacity of working 
memory does not decrease with age (e.g. Hamm & Hasher, 1992; Hasher & Zacks, 
1988). Thus, the higher number of words generated by younger adults is unlikely to be 
attributable to an increased working memory capacity. 
Rather, one possible explanation for the findings is that younger adults guessed 
the true purpose of the word completion task. All of the young adults in the sample were 
from residential colleges at the University of Queensland, and as many were in their first 
or second year, they would likely have had exposure to first year psychology research. 
Thus, they may have been aware of the use of deception in psychological research and 
may have purposely paid closer attention to the task in order to find out what the 
deception was. Indeed, following debriefing, several participants acknowledged that 
they had figured out that the word completion tasks included words from the story. In 
fact, one participant noted that once he realised, he purposely tried to remember words 
from the story because he believed that was what the task was really measuring. Thus, it 
is plausible to suppose that overall, more younger adults than older adults figured out 
the true purpose of the word completion tasks and adjusted their responses accordingly. 
Indeed, a similar effect was found in Hartman and Hasher’s (1991) study whereby a 
significant proportion of the younger adults had to be excluded from the dataset as they 
discovered the relationship between the stimuli presented and those tested on the 
indirect memory test. Similar to the current study, Hamm and Hasher took measures to 
avoid this occurrence, such as beginning each test trial with filler stimuli, and ensuring 
there were only a certain number of test stimuli in each trial. Despite these measures, a 
considerable number of the young adults still became aware of what was being tested. 
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Thus, it is entirely possible that the same phenomenon occurred in the current study, 
consequently influencing the results and providing a potential justification for why older 
adults did not generate more suspicious words than younger adults.  
 A closer inspection of the observed interaction between age and false statement 
type in the crime report task revealed an intriguing effect that was not part of the 
original prediction. At first glance, the findings showed that older adults’ average global 
ratings of the criminals in both conditions reflected what was expected of the younger 
adults, suggesting that they were successfully inhibiting the false information. In 
addition, the younger adults’ ratings appeared to contrast their respective false statement 
condition, suggesting that they were over-correcting for the particular condition they 
were assigned to. For example, if the false statements caused the criminal to appear 
more ruthless than he actually was, they appeared to over-compensate for this by rating 
the criminal in the ‘real’ report as less dangerous and deserving of a lighter sentence 
than average. Gilbert’s theory cannot account for this finding, as Gilbert et al.’s (1993) 
study revealed no such pattern. Indeed, these findings initially appear to suggest that 
inhibition does not have an influence on the comprehension and belief of information. A 
possible negative bias of older adults towards male perpetrators is not likely, as this 
would have resulted either in overall negative ratings of the criminal if they were 
inhibiting the irrelevant information successfully, or extremely negative ratings in the 
exacerbating condition if they were not inhibiting successfully; neither of these patterns 
were observed. The possible influence of mild dementia on some older adults’ 
understanding of the task was also ruled out, as the same results were observed when 
these participants were removed from the sample. 
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One possible explanation for the findings comes from further investigation into 
the research on social judgements. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that 
the phenomenon of over-correction can occur in situations that involve making 
judgements of targets in the presence of other contextual stimuli. In particular, in tasks 
where targets are ambiguous (such as the current crime report task, where the crime 
committed was neither exceedingly horrific nor minor), research indicates that while 
moderate contexts are more likely to lead to ratings that assimilate the target and 
environment, extreme contexts are more likely to lead to ratings of the target that 
contrast the context (Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). For example, subjects judging the 
importance of recycling rated it as much less important when exposed to other questions 
about very important issues such as abortion laws and capital punishment, and rated it as 
much less important in the context of more trivial issues such as leash laws for pets 
(Sherman, Ahlm, Berman, & Lynn, 1978). In the current study, the false contextual 
information regarding the criminal could also be regarded as ‘extreme’, as both the 
exacerbating and attenuating statements greatly altered the severity of the crime if 
incorporated into the real crime report. Thus, with an ambiguous crime report in the 
context of comparatively ‘extreme’ exacerbating and attenuating statements, subjects 
may have subsequently given the criminal ratings that were in contrast to the irrelevant 
contextual statements, resulting in over-correction.  
 One other question raised by the findings is why older adults did not over-correct 
like younger adults. The research on social judgements also provides further 
clarification of this finding. In their set/reset model, Martin, Seta and Crelia (1990) 
outlined the process that occurs when people make judgements in the context of other 
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stimuli. According to their model, when a context primes a set of thoughts (such as in 
the current study), the contextual information can interfere and make the target seem 
more similar to the context. However, when people realise that this has occurred, they 
may attempt to remove the primed thoughts from their representation of the target (this 
stage is called ‘resetting’). In doing so, they may unintentionally alter their original 
opinion of the target, resulting in them making a judgement correction that is in the 
opposite direction to their primed reaction to the contextual stimuli. The reason this can 
explain older adults’ ratings is that the process of ‘resetting’ to a contrasting judgement 
is thought to require more cognitive effort than assimilation (i.e. simply reverting to the 
contextual information) (Martin et al., 1990). In support of this notion, factors such as 
distraction have been found to lead to assimilation of contextual information, rather than 
contrast (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). This idea is remarkably similar to the previous 
discussion theorising that inhibition may mimic the effect of distraction in tasks 
involving inhibition of information, such as those in the current study. Thus, the finding 
that older adults did not over-correct may indicate that they may, to some extent, have 
been assimilating the irrelevant contextual stimuli into their judgements of the criminal. 
However, as this was evidently not due to distraction, it may in fact indicate that they 
were unable to inhibit the information. Thus, while the findings did not match the 
hypothesis exactly, the above argument sheds new light on the results and provides 
grounds for further investigation. 
 Following up on the unexpected interaction between age and false statement 
type, a mediation analysis revealed that inhibitory functioning was not predictive of the 
interaction. In light of the above accounts for the interaction, one possible justification 
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for this finding was that the executive functioning measures may not have assessed the 
particular subset of inhibition that was controlling older adults’ responses to the task. 
This suggestion is consistent with the argument that inhibition is not a uniform 
construct, but rather consists of several different pools of resources (Band et al., 2002; 
McDowd, 1997). The heterogeneity of inhibition is supported by the findings of Kramer 
et al. (1994) and Rush et al. (2006) that measures of inhibition often have weak inter-
task correlations, and this was also replicated in the current study. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to assume that the type of inhibition operating in the present study may 
represent yet another subset of inhibition, which could explain why scores on both the 
individual executive functioning measures and a composite measure of the correlated 
tests (Stroop and Connelly) did not mediate the interaction in the crime report task. 
 While the above explanations offer insight into the findings of the study, it is 
essential to integrate these with the main aims of the thesis. In terms of theoretical 
implications, this study has provided further support for the research established by 
Hasher and Zacks (1988) that inhibition decreases with age, as evidenced by the older 
adults’ poor performance on the executive functioning measures. This was to be 
expected, as the measures in the task have been employed in a wide range of studies, all 
revealing comparable results (Connelly et al., 1991; May & Hasher, 1998; Rush et al., 
2006; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; von Hippel et al., 2000).  
 Secondly, while the results did not wholly complement predictions, this study 
has added a new dimension to the literature on the social consequences of inhibition. It 
has also extended the research on discourse comprehension by bringing to light the idea 
that inhibition may affect the way we comprehend and believe information and 
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ultimately, why some people are more susceptible to fraud and deception. Vulnerability 
to fraud is likely to be influenced by a number of variables other than inhibitory 
functioning; however the findings of the study certainly do not exclude the possibility 
that inhibitory functioning has an influence.  
 In terms of practical implications, the inconclusive findings of the study do not 
presently provide any grounds for addressing older adults’ increased susceptibility to 
fraud in terms of their inhibitory functioning. While the alternative explanations of the 
findings suggested that inhibition may have an influence, the various methodological 
limitations of the study mean that future research is required, as will be discussed in the 
next section. If research were to reveal that age-related inhibitory losses do indeed 
influence belief in false or misleading information, this could have major implications 
for older adults, as such findings would suggest that they have little control over their 
vulnerability to being victims of fraudulent activity. However, research may heighten 
awareness of the issue and promote the development of interventions to help older 
adults to become more cautious of dubious or questionable information. Potential 
interventions include teaching older adults to not always rely on their own memory of 
information if they are at all doubtful, and to consult others whenever possible.  
Research Strengths and Limitations 
 The current study consisted of several methodological strengths and limitations. 
Firstly, it was the first study to investigate the possible link between inhibitory 
functioning and the way we comprehend and believe information. A particularly strong 
point was its grounding in several compelling, empirically supported theories. The 
support of Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) theory has been well documented (e.g. Connelly et 
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al., 1991; Hasher et al., 1991; Langley et al., 2005; May et al., 1999; McDowd & Filion, 
1992). Furthermore, Gilbert’s (1991) theory has its roots in historical models of 
discourse comprehension, and has also been supported by empirical research (Gilbert et 
al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). Thus, well-supported theories formed the basis for the 
current hypotheses, resulting in a plausible, testable theory. 
 One particular strength of the current study’s design was the response measure 
used in the suspicious story about the salesman. Similar to Hartman and Hasher’s (1991) 
study, the task was meticulously designed to prevent possible biases in responses or 
other unwanted effects. The current measure avoided memory effects by testing it 
implicitly at various points throughout the task. It also prevented the possible tendency 
to write shorter words by requiring voiced responses, and ensured target words were not 
too easy to guess by using filler items at the beginning of and throughout all word 
completion tasks. By taking these measures, there was a higher likelihood of accurately 
measuring which words were activated in the participants’ minds at various times during 
the story, as was the aim of the task.  
 Finally, the same experimenter tested all participants, ensuring virtually 
identical administration of all tasks and instructions to each participant. As the study 
comprised six to seven different tasks that each required considerable explanation, 
having one experimenter reduced potential error variance from inconsistencies in task 
administration. Furthermore, it ensured that all problems that arose during test 
administration were dealt with uniformly, and enabled any common problems to be 
recognised immediately and remedied with a standardised response. For example, 
several older participants ignored the anchors on some of the reverse-scored items on 
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the response scales and had to go back to invert their answer. To remedy this, the 
experimenter informed all subsequent participants that the scales were not all the same, 
and to read them carefully before answering. While this resolved the issue, the same 
may not have occurred if multiple experimenters had shared the testing, especially if 
they were not as familiar with the aims of the study and the measures in the task. 
 As mentioned previously, there were also several limitations in the study. Firstly, 
while a power analysis could not be conducted (as mentioned earlier), the 80 cases may 
not have provided enough statistical power to detect the hypothesised relationships, and 
a larger sample may have provided clearer results. However, the main concern regarded 
the representativeness of the sample of older adults, as they were part of a convenience 
sample that was bound by the constraints of the testing process. More specifically, as 
testing had to be conducted at the University of Queensland due to time and transport 
limitations, the respondents may not have been representative of their population. Quite 
importantly, the average age (72.2 years) was somewhat lower than the ages of 
participants from other studies investigating the effects of inhibition and social 
behaviour, such as von Hippel and Dunlop (2005) and von Hippel et al. (2000), whose 
samples had respective average ages of 78 and 80.2 years. While it was suggested that a 
possible cause for the non-significant results of the mediation analyses was that the 
executive functioning measures did not measure the relevant subset of inhibition, it is 
also possible that any influence of inhibition may have been masked by this ‘younger’ 
sample of older adults. More specifically, the proposed subset of inhibitory functioning 
that influences inhibition of false information may not have deteriorated in this sample 
as much as the type of inhibition measured by the executive functioning tasks. The 
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possible exposure to psychological research in the sample of younger adults also 
presented a problem, as discussed previously. 
 Another limitation of the study was imposed by the time constraints. The limited 
time frame prevented the opportunity to measure beliefs about the car in the salesman 
task at a later time, as increased activation of the ‘suspicious’ words in the story could 
have impacted on later judgement. However, it was not possible for participants to 
return at a later date to complete a follow-up measure. If extra time was available, pilot 
testing of the appropriateness of task items and measures would also have been useful. 
For example, the stimuli in the crime report could have been tested without the presence 
of the false information to assess baseline judgements of the criminal, which may have 
aided interpretation of the results. Pilot testing could also have revealed whether certain 
types of crimes (e.g. assault, shoplifting) resulted in more biased judgements than 
others, which could have led to modification of the stimuli to control for this. 
Furthermore, the opportunity to test a larger number of younger participants would have 
enabled the exclusion of those who guessed the true purpose of the word completion 
task.  
Future Directions 
 In light of the alternative explanations for the present findings and the various 
methodological limitations, there are several possible avenues for future research. 
Firstly, the study should be replicated with a more representative sample. This would 
involve recruiting older adults with a higher mean age, and including young adults who 
were not university students, as this could lead to different results that do not reflect 
response biases, as well as increase the generalisability of any significant findings. 
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Another highly recommended research direction is to alter the crime report task 
slightly in order to counter the observed effect of over-correction. Research has revealed 
ways to offset this effect. Rather than changing the contextual information itself to make 
it more ‘moderate’, research has shown that explicitly telling people to not compare 
their judgement of the target to the contextual stimuli has prevented contrast from 
occurring (Petty & Wegener, 1993). Furthermore, subtle cues designed to remind 
participants about the dissociation between the target and the context have also 
prevented contrast from occurring (Martin, 1986; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack, 
Martin, & Schwarz, 1988).  Thus, if such cues were provided in a replication of the 
current study, it may counter the effects of over-correction that were observed. For 
example, people could be reminded via the wording of the opinion questions that the 
criminal in the story was being charged for the crime of assault, and that they were on a 
jury that was responsible for answering various questions about the criminal. This may 
help them to focus on the specific details of the crime, rather than simply compare them 
to the details in the irrelevant report. 
 Another potential avenue of research for studies with a larger time frame would 
be to use a longitudinal design to investigate the effects of the stimuli in the current 
study on long-term memory of the information. While the current findings failed to 
reveal any clear indication that false information was believed in the short term (or that 
inhibition influenced this effect), it may be that memory is only influenced by the false 
information at a later date. That is, perhaps false information remains activated in older 
adults’ minds due to their poorer inhibitory functioning, but it does not influence their 
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beliefs about the information until a later date when memory traces are less salient and 
the demands of the task are not present.  
While replication of the current study with the above changes would be the first 
recommended step to take, there are also other opportunities to further investigate the 
proposed link between age, inhibition and belief from a broader perspective. Firstly, as 
the current study only included written stimuli, it may be valuable to investigate whether 
different channels of communication influence older adults’ beliefs in false information. 
Perhaps there is an interaction, whereby inhibition does influence older adults’ belief in 
false information, but only for verbally communicated information, or written 
information in newspapers and articles. 
Secondly, as people’s susceptibility to fraud and deception would undoubtedly 
be influenced by a number of different factors (possibly including inhibition), there is 
also the potential for applied research to be conducted in this area. One criticism of the 
current study (and any replications of it) is that the findings may not necessarily apply to 
real-world situations; thus, considering the impact that could occur if findings showed 
that inhibition did lead to increased belief in false information, it may be important to 
conduct applied research in order to observe the effect of other variables that may not be 
present in a laboratory setting. For example, an effect found in controlled settings may 
disappear in a real-world setting if people do not believe false or suspicious information 
when it is personally relevant, or if it could lead to real-life consequences. Thus, while 
ethical constraints may limit the types of applied research that could be conducted, it 
certainly is one area with potential for further study. 
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In conclusion, while the findings of the current study did not explicitly support 
the hypotheses, the alternative explanations provide valuable insight as to the reasons 
this may have occurred, and provide many opportunities for follow-up research. If the 
theory proposed by this thesis were to be validated in subsequent studies, the 
implications would necessitate further research into possible ways to reduce the effect of 
inhibitory losses on older adults’ belief in false or misleading information. At the 
present time, the primary recommendation is to replicate the current study with the 
suggested changes in order to further investigate the validity of this new theory, and 
whether it can expand on the developing research of the social consequences of age-
related inhibitory deficits. 
 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         51
References 
 
Arbuckle, T. Y., & Pushkar Gold, D. (1993). Aging, inhibition, and verbosity. Journal 
of Gerontology, 48(5), P225. 
Band, G. P. H., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & Segalowitz, S. (2002). Explaining 
neurocognitive aging: Is one factor enough? Brain and Cognition, 49(3), 259-
267. 
Baron, R. S., Baron, P. H., & Miller, N. (1973). The relation between distraction and 
persuasion. Psychological Bulletin, 80(4), 310-323. 
Bodenhausen, G. V., & Macrae, C. N. (1998). Stereotype activation and inhibition. In R. 
S. Wyer (Ed.), Stereotype activation and inhibition. Advances in social 
cognition, Vol. 11. Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum Associates. 
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Hix, H. R. (1998). The role of inhibitory processes in 
young children's difficulties with deception and false belief. Child Development, 
69(3), 672-691. 
Connelly, S. L., & Hasher, L. (1993). Aging and the inhibition of spatial location. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
19(6), 1238-1250. 
Connelly, S. L., Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1991). Age and reading: The impact of 
distraction. Psychology and Aging, 6, 533-541. 
DeJong, R., Coles, M. G., & Logan, G. D. (1995). Strategies and mechanisms in 
nonselective and selective inhibitory motor control. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 21, 498-511. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief 52
Dempster, F. N. (1992). The rise and fall of the inhibitory mechanism - Toward a 
unified theory of cognitive-development and aging. Developmental Review, 
12(1), 45-75. 
Dempster, F. N. (1993). Resistance to interference: Developmental changes in a basic 
processing mechanism. In M. L. Howe & R. Pasnak (Eds.), Emerging themes in 
cognitive development, Vol. 1: Foundations. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Dulaney, C. L., Marks, W., & Link, K. E. (2004). Aging and directed forgetting: Pre-cue 
encoding and post-cue rehearsal effects. Experimental Aging Research, 30(1), 
95-112. 
Gernsbacher, M. A., & Faust, M. E. (1991). The mechanism of suppression: A 
component of general comprehension skill. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 245-262. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107-
119. 
Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and 
application of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
60, 509-517. 
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Malone, P. S. (1990). Unbelieving the unbelievable: Some 
problems in the rejection of false information. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 59, 601-613. 
Gilbert, D. T., Tafarodi, R. W., & Malone, P. S. (1993). You can't not believe 
everything you read. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology(65), 221-
233. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         53
Hamm, V. P., & Hasher, L. (1992). Age and the availability of inferences. Psychology 
and Aging, 7(1), 56-64. 
Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: Theories, 
definitions, and research evidence. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), 
New perspectives on interference and inhibition in cognition. San Diego: 
Academic Press. 
Harnishfeger, K. K., & Bjorklund, D. F. (1994). A developmental perspective on 
individual differences in inhibition. Learning and Individual Differences, 6, 331-
335. 
Harnishfeger, K. K., & Pope, R. S. (1996). Intending to forget: The development of 
cognitive inhibition in directed forgetting. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 62(2), 292-315. 
Hartman, M., & Hasher, L. (1991). Aging and suppression: Memory for previously 
relevant information. Psychology and Aging, 6(4), 587-594. 
Hasher, L., Chung, C., May, C. P., & Foong, N. (2002). Age, time of testing, and 
proactive interference. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 56, 200-
207. 
Hasher, L., Stolzfus, E. R., Zacks, R. T., & Rypma, B. (1991). Age and inhibition. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 17(1), 
163-169. 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1988). Working memory, comprehension, and aging: A 
review and a new view. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation, 22. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief 54
Hasher, L., Zacks, R. T., & May, C. P. (1999). Inhibitory control, circadian arousal, and 
age. In Attention and Performance Xvii (Vol. 17, pp. 653-675). 
Herr, P. S., Sherman, S. J., & Fazio, R. H. (1983). On the consequences of priming: 
Assimilation and contrast effects. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
19, 323-340. 
Houghton, G., & Tipper, S. P. (1996). Inhibitory mechanisms of neural and cognitive 
control: Applications to selective attention and sequential action. Brain and 
Cognition, 30, 20-43. 
Kane, M. J., Hasher, L., Stoltzfus, E. R., Zacks, R. T., & Connelly, S. L. (1994). 
Inhibitory attentional mechanisms and aging. Psychology and Aging, 9(1), 103-
112. 
Kramer, A. F., Humphrey, D. G., Larish, J. F., Logan, G. D., & Strayer, D. L. (1994). 
Aging and inhibition: Beyond a unitary view of inhibitory processing in 
attention. Psychology and Aging, 9(4), 491-512. 
Kukull, W. A., Larson, E. G., Teri, L., Bowen, J., McCormick, W., & Pfanschmidt, M. 
L. (1994). The Mini-Mental State Examination score and the clinical diagnosis 
of dementia. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 47, 1061-1067. 
Langley, L. K., Vivas, A. B., Fuentes, L. J., & Bagne, A. G. (2005). Differential age 
effects on attention-based inhibition: Inhibitory tagging and inhibition of return. 
Psychology and Aging, 20(2), 356-360. 
Lustig, C., May, C. P., & Hasher, L. (2001). Working memory span and the role of 
proactive interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 130(2), 
199-207. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         55
Martin, L. L. (1986). Set/reset: Use and disuse of concepts in impression formation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 493-504. 
Martin, L. L., Seta, J. J., & Crelia, R. A. (1990). Assimilation and contrast as a function 
of people’s willingness and ability to expend effort in forming an impression. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 27-37. 
May, C. P., & Hasher, L. (1998). Synchrony effects in inhibitory control over thought 
and action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 24(2), 363-379. 
May, C. P., Hasher, L., & Kane, M. J. (1999). The role of interference in memory span. 
Memory & Cognition, 27(5), 759-767. 
McDowd, J. M. (1997). Inhibition in attention and aging. Journals of Gerontology 
Series B-Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 52(6), P265-P273. 
McDowd, J. M., & Filion, D. L. (1992). Aging, selective attention, and inhibitory 
processes: A psychophysiological approach. Psychology and Aging, 7(1), 65-71. 
McDowd, J. M., & Oseaskreger, D. M. (1991). Aging, inhibitory processes, and 
negative priming. Journals of Gerontology, 46(6), P340-P345. 
Muscat, G., James, M., & Graycar, A. (2002). Trends and issues in crime and criminal 
justice: Older people and consumer fraud (No. 220). Canberra: Australian 
Institute of Criminology. 
Persad, C. C., Abeles, N., Zacks, R. T., & Denburg, N. L. (2002). Inhibitory changes 
after age 60 and their relationship to measures of attention and memory. 
Journals of Gerontology Series B-Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 
57(3), P223-P232. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief 56
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1993). Flexible correction processes in social judgment: 
Correcting for context induced contrast. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 29, 137-165. 
Petty, R. E., Wells, G. L., & Brock, T. C. (1976). Distraction can enhance or reduce 
yielding to propaganda: Thought disruption versus effort justification. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 874-884. 
Raz, N. (2000). Aging of the brain and its impact on cognitive performance: Integration 
of structural and functional findings. In. Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Publishers. 
Rush, B. K., Barch, D. M., & Braver, T. S. (2006). Accounting for cognitive aging: 
Context processing, inhibition or processing speed? Aging Neuropsychology and 
Cognition, 13(3-4), 588-610. 
Salthouse, T. A., & Babcock, R. L. (1991). Decomposing adult age-differences in 
working memory. Developmental Psychology, 27, 763-776. 
Salthouse, T. A., & Meinz, E. J. (1995). Aging, Inhibition, Working-Memory, and 
Speed. Journals of Gerontology Series B-Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 50(6), P297-P306. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: 
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 45, 513-523. 
Sherman, S. J., Ahlm, K., Berman, L., & Lynn, S. (1978). Contrast effects and their 
relationship to subsequent behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
14, 340-350. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         57
Shimamura, A. P., Jurica, P. J., Mangels, J. A., Gershberg, F. B., & Knight, R. T. 
(1995). Susceptibility to memory interference effects following frontal lobe 
damage: Findings from tests of paired-associate learning. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 7(2), 144-152. 
Smith, R. G. (1999). Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice: Fraud and 
financial abuse of older persons (No. 132). Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology. 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Schwarz, N. (1988). Priming and communication: Social 
determinants of information use in judgments of life satisfaction. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 429-442. 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in selective attention: The relation of 
priming and interference to cognitive failure. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 8, 667-675. 
Sweeney, J. A., Rosano, C., Berman, R. A., & Luna, B. (2001). Inhibitory control of 
attention declines more than working memory during normal aging. 
Neurobiology of Aging, 22(1), 39-47. 
Valeriani, M., Ranghi, F., & Giaquinto, S. (2003). The effects of aging on selective 
attention to touch: a reduced inhibitory control in elderly subjects? International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 49(1), 75-87. 
von Hippel, W., & Dunlop, S. M. (2005). Aging, inhibition, and social 
inappropriateness. Psychology and Aging, 20(3), 519-523. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief 58
von Hippel, W., Silver, L. A., & Lynch, M. E. (2000). Stereotyping against your will: 
The role of inhibitory ability in stereotyping and prejudice among the elderly. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 523-532. 
West, R. L. (1996). An application of prefrontal cortex function theory to cognitive 
aging. Psychological Bulletin, 120(2), 272-292. 
Williams, B. R., Ponesse, J. S., Schachar, R. J., Logan, G. D., & Tannock, R. (1999). 
Development of inhibitory control across the life span. Developmental 
Psychology, 35(1), 205-213. 
Wilson, S. P., & Kipp, K. (1998). The development of efficient inhibition: Evidence 
from directed-forgetting tasks. Developmental Review, 18, 86-123. 
Wilson, T. C. (1996). Cohort and prejudice: Whites' attitudes towards Blacks, Hispanics, 
Jews and Asians. Public Opinion Quarterly, 60, 253-274. 
Yoon, C., May, C. P., & Hasher, L. (2000). Aging, circadian arousal patterns and 
cognition. In D. C. Park & N. Schwartz (Eds.), Cognitive Aging: A Primer.
Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 
Zacks, R. T., Radvansky, G., & Hasher, L. (1996). Studies of directed forgetting in older 
adults. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 
22(1), 143-156. 
Zellner, M., & Bauml, K. H. (2006). Inhibitory deficits in older adults: List-method 
directed forgetting revisited. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning 
Memory and Cognition, 32(2), 290-300. 
 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         59
Appendix A 
 
Stroop Task Materials 
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RED  BLUE YELLOW  
GREEN BROWN  RED  
YELLOW BLUE PURPLE 
PURPLE PURPLE  GREEN  
BLUE YELLOW BLUE 
GREEN PURPLE  RED 
GREEN RED YELLOW 
PURPLE GREEN RED 
RED BLUE BLUE 
BLUE YELLOW GREEN  
YELLOW  PURPLE GREEN 
GREEN RED RED 
BROWN PURPLE BLUE 
PURPLE RED PURPLE 
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Stroop Error Sheet
(mark ‘X’ if incorrect) 
Participant no.____________ 
Block Word  Block Word 
Col. 1   Col. 3   
Green   Blue   
Red   Green   
Blue   Red   
Yellow   Green   
Blue   Yellow   
Red   Blue   
Yellow   Red   
Green   Green   
Red   Yellow   
Yellow   Blue   
Blue   Green   
Red   Yellow   
Yellow   Red   
Blue   Green   
Col. 2      
Red   Tick if all 
correct 
Yellow   
Green   
Yellow   
Blue   
Green   
Red   
Blue   
Yellow   
Green   
Red   
Blue   
Green   
Yellow   
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Appendix B 
 
Connelly Paragraphs Stimuli 
 
PARAGRAPH SET 1 
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PARAGRAPH SET 2 
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PARAGRAPH SET 3 
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PARAGRAPH SET 4 
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Appendix C 
 
Working Memory Task Stimuli 
 
Set 1 – two sentences
Every morning Sarah walks the dog before going to school. 
Jane was late this morning because she missed the train. 
 
Sunflowers can grow to be over one metre tall. 
Alice in Wonderland was my favourite book when I was a child. 
 
Set 2 – three sentences
Peter plays soccer every Saturday morning before lunch. 
Last year I went to Dubbo on a holiday with my family. 
She served them each a portion of vegetables. 
 
The man wore a red shirt and black pants out to dinner. 
One of Emma’s hobbies is horse riding. 
Working in a bank can be a very tedious job. 
 
Set 3 – four sentences
Mary is knitting a purple jumper for her daughter. 
Alex will often spend the afternoon working in the garden. 
When Judy broke her arm she had to go to hospital. 
Whoever comes first in the race will win a prize. 
 
It looks like it will rain for the rest of the week. 
My aunt left her reading glasses on her bedside table. 
The fastest way to travel from Brisbane to Sydney is by plane. 
The public can always be better informed when it comes to health. 
 
Set 4 – five sentences
I was surprised to get a phone call from England last night. 
I start every morning with a strong cup of coffee. 
On the weekends John lounges around watching television. 
I’m going out for coffee with some friends. 
I went shopping yesterday and bought myself some new shoes. 
 
Yesterday, my brother went out to play football. 
Inside the room a skinny man sat in a large armchair. 
I’m going to sit outside and read the newspaper. 
I can’t believe how much you’ve improved at tennis. 
The music was so loud it woke up the neighbours. 
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Appendix D 
 
Crime Report Task Materials 
 
Exacerbating condition*
The crime took place at about 5pm on a winter evening, and it was fairly dark. 
Prior to the assault, the attacker had been spying on the woman from a little way 
off. 
The young woman was walking down the road, and the attacker began following about 
20 metres behind her. 
The attacker was carrying a pocket-knife with him. 
The victim was not aware that a man was following her. 
The attacker hit her forcefully from behind. 
The attacker pushed the victim into the bushes, out of sight of other people. 
The attacker grabbed at the woman’s bag as she fell to the ground. 
The victim was hurt badly. 
The victim wrestled back to try to get her bag from the attacker. 
The attacker kicked her twice in the stomach. 
The attacker grabbed her bag back.  
The attacker then continued to kick and beat the victim. 
He then ran off. 
 
Attenuating condition*
The crime took place at about 5pm on a winter evening, and it was fairly dark. 
The attacker was late for a job interview on the other side of town, but was walking 
because he could not afford the taxi fare.   
The young woman was walking down the road, and the attacker began following about 
20 metres behind her. 
The attacker was unarmed. 
The victim was not aware that a man was following her. 
The attacker asked for the time. 
The attacker pushed the victim into the bushes, out of sight of other people. 
The man grabbed at the woman’s bag as she fell to the ground. 
The victim was not hurt badly. 
The victim wrestled back to try to get her bag from the attacker. 
The attacker said if she gave in she would not get hurt. 
The attacker grabbed her bag back.  
The attacker hurriedly apologised for his actions. 
He then ran off. 
 
* False statements shown in bold 
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Practice trial*
The man walked into the petrol station, wearing a black jacket. 
A getaway car was parked outside the scene of the crime. 
The man snuck to the back corner and put a chocolate bar in his pocket. 
The offender’s accomplice was waiting around the corner. 
*False statements shown in bold 
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Appendix E 
 
Salesman Story Task Materials 
 
N.B. Target words are bolded and underlined 
 Target word types are shown in parentheses:  
 AT = apparently truthful 
 AU = apparently untruthful 
 N = neutral 
 
Two used-car salesmen are standing out the front of their office, in the car yard, looking 
out for potential customers. They are chatting about the Friday night football game when 
they notice a young man approach their dealership and have a look at some of the cars. 
He looks like a college student, appears a little bewildered and is only looking at the 
cheaper cars. 
 
Salesman 1: Looks like a first-timer to me Roger. 
 
Salesman 2: Without a doubt…I don’t think he’d know a BMW from a bicycle. (N) 
 
Salesman 1: Haha I’d bet on that actually…so you want to take this one? 
 
Salesman 2: Sure do! Make us a coffee for when I’m done – you watch, I’ll sell this kid 
a car before the water boils. (N) 
 
The salesman walks casually up to the young man, who is looking at an older station 
wagon. 
 
Salesman: Wouldn’t a young lad like you want something flashier to impress the ladies?
(N) 
Word completion task: 
Hum…… 
La…… 
Bo…… 
Acc…… 
Bi…… 
To…… 
 
Student: Oh for sure, if only I could afford it! No, I’m just having a look around for 
something to get me to uni - just something cheap but reliable. 
 
Salesman: Well we’ve got exactly what you need! 
 
Student: Really? Sounds pretty good, let’s have a look. 
The salesman takes him over to an old, fairly shabby hatchback. 
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Salesman: This here is a fantastic little car – it may not look like it, but it’s got great 
power and incredible handling. 
 
Student: Really? It’s tiny - it looks like it would go pretty slow. (AT) 
 
Salesman: Oh no, this model was far ahead of its time, it’s got a lot of power. (AU) 
 
Student: Well that’s all well and good…but is it going to be safe? It doesn’t look very 
sturdy. It just seems a bit unsafe. (AT) 
Word completion task: 
Pu…… 
Fi…… 
Po…… 
Uns…… 
Lin…… 
Sl…… 
 
Salesman: Why, it’s extremely safe! All our cars go through a 100-point safety check 
before we sell them, and this one is 100% safe and secure. (AU)  
 
Student: Hmmm, okay… 
 
The student walks around the car, inspecting it closely for any signs of damage. He 
stops when he gets to the front, noticing some big scrapes on the bonnet. 
 
Student: What’s this here? It looks like it’s scratched, was it in a crash? (AT) 
The salesman goes over to have a look, sees the scrapes, and looks surprised. (N) 
Word completion task: 
Ne…… 
Sur…… 
Do…… 
Cr…… 
In…… 
Sec…… 
 
Salesman: Err…no… That's actually our paint protector. When we first apply it, it looks 
like it's scratched, and then after a few weeks it seals up. Trust me it's good, it provides a 
solid barrier for the paint. (AU) 
The student continues to inspect the outside of the car. 
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Salesman: Look, how about we take it for a drive? The best way to get a feel for a car is 
to take it out for a test. (N) 
 
Student: That’s a good idea. I always like to try before I buy! 
 
Salesman: Well that’s very wise of you indeed. Here are the keys, let’s go for a drive! 
 
Word completion task: 
 
Mo...... 
Att...... 
Tra...... 
Bar...... 
Gl...... 
Te...... 
 
The salesman gets in the passenger side and the student goes to open the door on the 
driver’s side. 
 
Student: Hmm…this door is stuck…I can’t get it open. Is it broken? (AT) 
 
Salesman: Oh... just give it a good pull, it’ll ease up. It’s, ah, just a bit sticky from being 
serviced, they always cover the handles with an anti-rust spray. The stickiness won’t 
last long. (AU) 
 
Student: Oh…really..? Ok then… 
 
The student pulls the door hard, and it opens. He gets in and looks around the car, 
noticing a rather strong smell. (N) 
 
Word completion task: 
 
Rec...... 
Sm...... 
Pa...... 
Spr...... 
Bro...... 
Ga...... 
 
Student: Wow…what is that smell? Smells like the last owner never showered! It smells 
really dirty. (AT) 
Salesman: Oh…sorry about that… it’s our new cleaning product. It smells a bit strange 
for a few days but it does a fantastic job. Trust me, this car is spotlessly clean! (AU) 
 
Student: Yuck…well I sure hope it goes within a few days… Anyway, let’s get this 
thing started. 
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The student starts the car up and reverses. He drives out of the dealership and onto the 
street. He notices that the car is very shaky. (N) 
 
Student: Hey…why is it shaking? Cars don’t normally do this. Is something wrong with 
the suspension that’s making it so shaky? (AT) 
Word completion task: 
Di...... 
Sha...... 
Str...... 
Ha...... 
Cle...... 
Sil...... 
 
Salesman: No the suspension is fine, don’t worry about it. It’s just the road we’re on, it’s 
a bit bumpy. (AU) 
The student doesn’t seem persuaded but they continue driving. They eventually stop at 
some lights, and the salesman instructs the student to turn left. The student looks up at 
the corner of the windshield, noticing what seems to be a crack. (N) 
 
Student: Is that a crack? That glass should’ve been replaced if it’s a crack. (AT) 
Word completion task: 
 
Be...... 
Ti...... 
Bu...... 
Hea...... 
Cr...... 
Le...... 
 
Salesman: Oh, we check all the cars for cracks and breaks. It’s not a crack. In fact, I’m 
sure we can clean that one off, it just looks like a bit of a mark. (AU) 
The student looks less than impressed. They drive back towards the dealership and the 
car begins to make a squeaky noise. (N) 
Student: Are you serious? I thought you said this car was trouble-free. Do you hear that 
sound? Sounds to me like the brakes have a problem! (AT) 
 
Word completion task: 
So...... 
Mar...... 
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Da...... 
Pro...... 
No...... 
Pla...... 
 
Salesman: Look I know this hasn’t been the best test drive, but you’ve got nothing to 
worry about! Most likely something just needs a bit of grease. (AU) 
They drive back into the dealership and park near the front. (N) 
 
Salesman: So, what did you think? She’s a beauty isn’t she?  
 
Student: I’m not so convinced… It seems there were quite a few problems there. And 
when was the last time the tyres were changed? They didn’t grip at all, they seem very 
worn. (AT) 
Salesman: Look, we give all cars new tyres - I don’t know what you’re talking about. 
There’s always a bit of oil on the road around here, it was just a bit slippery. (AU) 
Word completion task: 
Ho...... 
Ob...... 
Wor...... 
Sli...... 
Fro...... 
Gre...... 
 
Student: Well…how much is it then? It’s not the quality I was looking for but I suppose 
I’m just after something cheap. 
 
Salesman: Well the price is one thing I know will make you happy! She’s yours for 
$8560.  
 
Student: Really? That’s a fair bit more than I was prepared to pay. In fact, for an old car, 
that’s pretty dear. (AT) 
 
Salesman: Look, it’s a fantastic deal compared to some other cars, and trust me, it’s a 
good car! It’s reliable and it’s a bargain! (AU) 
Word completion task: 
Jo...... 
Ru...... 
Wea...... 
De...... 
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Mil...... 
Bar...... 
 
Student: I suppose…. Well, maybe I should consider it then. 
 
Salesman: Absolutely, it’s a great buy. Let’s go inside shall we, and discuss this some 
more? 
 
Student: Ok then. 
 
They go inside to the salesman’s desk to further discuss the car. 
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Appendix F 
 
Mini-Mental Status Exam Materials 
 
N.B. The Mini-Mental Status Exam comprises only the items with grey squares in the 
scoring box. It is scored out of 30. 
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Appendix G 
 
Demographics Survey, Information Sheet, and Consent Form 
 
Demographics
Age: 
 
Sex: 
 
Highest level of Education: 
 
Have you ever had a serious head injury? Yes / No 
 
Have you ever had a stroke? Yes / No 
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Impression Formation in Older Adults – Information For Participants
Thank you for participating in this research. This research is concerned with how older adults 
form impressions of others as compared to younger adults, and the cognitive factors that are 
associated with this process. We are grateful for your participation as the success of our research 
depends on the assistance of participants.  
 
Your participation in this research will involve a series of measures. Some of them can be 
categorised as performance measures, in that you’ll be asked to make speeded judgments or 
answer difficult questions. Other measures can be categorised opinion measures, in that you are 
simply asked how you feel about different issues, and there are no right or wrong answers. If 
you feel uncomfortable responding to any of the measures, you are encouraged to skip them or 
discontinue participation. While we anticipate that participation in this study poses minimal 
risks for you as a participant, some people may, due to their personal experience, find some 
aspects of their participation distressing. Participation in this research will take around one hour 
at a location of your choice, for which you will be reimbursed $20 for each hour, or part of an 
hour, that you complete. 
 
Responses provided during these sessions will remain completely anonymous and confidential, 
and raw data will be securely stored. Only members of the research team will have access to 
your data. Data from this research will be published in de-identified form, and so no individual’s 
responses will be able to be identified. You will be given an identification code which we will 
ask you to write on the questionnaires in order to match these up, however, this in no way 
personally identifies you.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary; you may withdraw from the study at any point without 
penalty simply by indicating to the experimenter that you wish to do so. Should you decide to 
withdraw from the project, you will still be reimbursed for your time accordingly. If you have 
any questions during the study please feel free to ask the experimenter. If you would like to 
obtain further readings on this topic or if you would like to obtain a copy of the results once 
available you can contact the chief investigator (Tania McMahon can be reached at 0417 778 
498 or taniamcm@psy.uq.edu.au). We hope that you would find this material educational. 
 
This study has been cleared in accordance with the ethical review processes of the University of 
Queensland and within the guidelines of the National Health & Medical Research Council.  You 
are, of course, free to discuss your participation with project staff (contactable on: 0417778498).  
If you would like to speak to an officer of the University not involved in the study, you may 
contact one of the School of Psychology Ethics Review Officers directly on 3365 6394 or by 
email: john@psy.uq.edu.au for John McLean, or on 3346 9517 or by e-mail: 
stone@psy.uq.edu.au for Valerie Stone, or contact the University of Queensland Ethics Officer 
on 3365 3924, e-mail: humanethics@research.uq.edu.au
Thanks again for your time. 
Tania McMahon 
Chief Investigator 
School of Psychology 
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Impression Formation in Older Adults – Consent Form
I have read and understood the information provided on the ‘Information for 
Participants’ form. I have had any questions answered to my satisfaction and understand 
that if I have any additional questions or concerns I can ask the experimenter during 
today’s session at any point or contact the research team after the session has completed. 
I understand that my participation is completely voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without comment or penalty. I am aware that 
should I choose to withdraw, I will still be reimbursed for my time accordingly. I am 
aware that my responses will be treated in the strictest confidentiality, and that any 
publications or presentations that arise from these data will be aggregated at the group 
level, so individual responses are not identifiable. I understand that I can contact the 
Research Ethics Officer on 3365 3924 or humanethics@research.uq.edu.au if I have 
concerns about the ethical conduct of this project. 
 
By signing below I give my informed consent to participate in this study, but I can still 
withdraw from the study at any point.  
_____________________________________  ______________  
Signature of Participant      Date 
 
_____________________________________  ______________  
Signature of Witness       Date 
 
_____________________________________ 
William von Hippel 
Professor & Chief Investigator 
School of Psychology 
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Appendix H 
 
SPSS Output – Transformed Data 
Regression 
Age = age in years 
Crime = crime condition 
Interac = age x crime condition interaction 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a . Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.436a .190 .158 2.203
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
ANOVAb
84.443 3 28.148 5.799 .001a
359.211 74 4.854
443.654 77
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.619 .250 22.502 .000
-.069 .250 -.029 -.278 .782
.481 .250 .201 1.924 .058
-.931 .250 -.390 -3.726 .000
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a . Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.459a .211 .179 2.187
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
ANOVAb
94.702 3 31.567 6.599 .001a
353.978 74 4.783
448.679 77
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
5.022 .248 20.259 .000
.053 .248 .022 .213 .832
.803 .248 .335 3.238 .002
-.778 .248 -.324 -3.137 .002
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
LSTROOP = Logarithmically transformed Stroop scores 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
LSTROOP,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.437a .191 .145 2.245
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LSTROOP, CRIME, INTERAC,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
83.440 4 20.860 4.138 .005a
352.880 70 5.041
436.320 74
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LSTROOP, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.651 .306 18.466 .000
-.045 .350 -.019 -.130 .897
.481 .261 .199 1.844 .069
-.931 .262 -.386 -3.548 .001
.032 1.741 .003 .018 .986
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
LSTROOP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief         85
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
LSTROOP,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.489a .239 .196 2.159
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LSTROOP, CRIME, INTERAC,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
102.607 4 25.652 5.502 .001a
326.379 70 4.663
428.987 74
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LSTROOP, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
4.761 .294 16.178 .000
.233 .336 .097 .693 .491
.913 .251 .382 3.644 .001
-.652 .252 -.272 -2.583 .012
-1.938 1.674 -.164 -1.158 .251
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
LSTROOP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
LPARAG = Logarithmically transformed Connelly paragraphs scores 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
LPARAG,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.438a .192 .145 2.232
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LPARAG, INTERAC, CRIME,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
81.449 4 20.362 4.088 .005a
343.700 69 4.981
425.149 73
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LPARAG, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.598 .415 13.484 .000
-.082 .288 -.034 -.284 .777
.527 .282 .219 1.866 .066
-.887 .261 -.370 -3.404 .001
-.023 1.137 -.003 -.021 .984
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
LPARAG
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
LPARAG,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.481a .231 .186 2.176
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LPARAG, INTERAC, CRIME,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
98.185 4 24.546 5.183 .001a
326.801 69 4.736
424.986 73
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LPARAG, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
4.729 .405 11.682 .000
.089 .281 .037 .316 .753
.941 .275 .392 3.421 .001
-.734 .254 -.306 -2.887 .005
-.835 1.108 -.095 -.753 .454
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
LPARAG
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
LSPEED = Logarithmically transformed Speed scores 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
LSPEED,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.454a .206 .162 2.207
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LSPEED, CRIME, INTERAC,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
91.197 4 22.799 4.682 .002a
350.622 72 4.870
441.818 76
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LSPEED, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
13.919 6.687 2.082 .041
.250 .367 .104 .681 .498
.491 .252 .205 1.951 .055
-.912 .252 -.381 -3.624 .001
-2.635 2.118 -.191 -1.244 .218
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
LSPEED
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
LSPEED,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.485a .236 .193 2.144
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LSPEED, CRIME, INTERAC,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
102.001 4 25.500 5.547 .001a
330.986 72 4.597
432.987 76
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LSPEED, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
-2.790 6.497 -.429 .669
-.310 .357 -.131 -.868 .388
.857 .245 .361 3.505 .001
-.730 .245 -.308 -2.986 .004
2.460 2.058 .180 1.195 .236
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
LSPEED
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
Ageing, Inhibition and False Belief 90
Appendix I 
 
SPSS Output – Manova excluding MMSE scores < 27 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Between-Subjects Factors
young 38
old 29
Exacerbatin
g (worse) 31
Extenuating
(better) 36
1
2
age group
1
2
Crime condition
Value Label N
Multivariate Testsb
.981 619.180a 5.000 59.000 .000
.019 619.180a 5.000 59.000 .000
52.473 619.180a 5.000 59.000 .000
52.473 619.180a 5.000 59.000 .000
.131 1.777a 5.000 59.000 .132
.869 1.777a 5.000 59.000 .132
.151 1.777a 5.000 59.000 .132
.151 1.777a 5.000 59.000 .132
.195 2.857a 5.000 59.000 .022
.805 2.857a 5.000 59.000 .022
.242 2.857a 5.000 59.000 .022
.242 2.857a 5.000 59.000 .022
.198 2.912a 5.000 59.000 .020
.802 2.912a 5.000 59.000 .020
.247 2.912a 5.000 59.000 .020
.247 2.912a 5.000 59.000 .020
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
agegrp
crimecond
agegrp * crimecond
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
Design: Intercept+agegrp+crimecond+agegrp * crimecondb. 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
how dangerous is 
attacker 81.646(a) 3 27.215 6.286 .001
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 18.325(b) 3 6.108 3.250 .028
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 14.285(c) 3 4.762 1.890 .140
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 98.692(d) 3 32.897 7.299 .000
Corrected Model 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
37.057(e) 3 12.352 2.907 .041
how dangerous is 
attacker 2092.710 1 2092.710 483.337 .000
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 393.103 1 393.103 209.130 .000
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 586.990 1 586.990 233.021 .000
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 1644.031 1 1644.031 364.781 .000
Intercept 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
1344.873 1 1344.873 316.512 .000
how dangerous is 
attacker .052 1 .052 .012 .913
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 13.853 1 13.853 7.370 .009
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker .238 1 .238 .095 .759
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender .149 1 .149 .033 .856
agegrp 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
.281 1 .281 .066 .798
how dangerous is 
attacker 15.249 1 15.249 3.522 .065
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 1.413 1 1.413 .752 .389
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 7.348 1 7.348 2.917 .093
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 62.288 1 62.288 13.821 .000
crimecond 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
21.149 1 21.149 4.977 .029
agegrp * crimecond how dangerous is 
attacker 56.235 1 56.235 12.988 .001
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feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 3.070 1 3.070 1.633 .206
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 4.865 1 4.865 1.931 .170
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 23.825 1 23.825 5.286 .025
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
10.617 1 10.617 2.499 .119
how dangerous is 
attacker 272.772 63 4.330
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 118.422 63 1.880
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 158.700 63 2.519
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 283.935 63 4.507
Error 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
267.690 63 4.249
how dangerous is 
attacker 2521.000 67
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 558.000 67
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 770.000 67
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 2108.000 67
Total 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
1657.000 67
how dangerous is 
attacker 354.418 66
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 136.746 66
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 172.985 66
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 382.627 66
Corrected Total 
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
304.746 66
a R Squared = .230 (Adjusted R Squared = .194) 
b R Squared = .134 (Adjusted R Squared = .093) 
c R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .039) 
d R Squared = .258 (Adjusted R Squared = .223) 
e R Squared = .122 (Adjusted R Squared = .080) 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
3. age group * Crime condition 
 
95% Confidence Interval 
Dependent Variable age group Crime condition Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Exacerbating (worse) 4.278 .490 3.298 5.258young 
Attenuating (better) 7.100 .465 6.170 8.030
Exacerbating (worse) 6.077 .577 4.924 7.230
how dangerous is 
attacker 
old 
Attenuating (better) 5.188 .520 4.148 6.227
Exacerbating (worse) 3.278 .323 2.632 3.924young 
Attenuating (better) 2.550 .307 1.937 3.163
Exacerbating (worse) 1.923 .380 1.163 2.683
feelings towards attacker 
(pos/neg) 
old 
Attenuating (better) 2.063 .343 1.378 2.747
Exacerbating (worse) 3.667 .374 2.919 4.414young 
Attenuating (better) 2.450 .355 1.741 3.159
Exacerbating (worse) 3.000 .440 2.120 3.880
how hostile/friendly was 
attacker 
old 
Attenuating (better) 2.875 .397 2.082 3.668
Exacerbating (worse) 3.389 .500 2.389 4.389young 
Attenuating (better) 6.550 .475 5.601 7.499
Exacerbating (worse) 4.692 .589 3.516 5.869
recommend min or max 
sentence for offender 
old 
Attenuating (better) 5.438 .531 4.377 6.498
Exacerbating (worse) 5.444 .486 4.474 6.415young 
Attenuating (better) 3.500 .461 2.579 4.421
Exacerbating (worse) 4.769 .572 3.627 5.912
attack caused by 
circumstance or 
personality 
old 
Attenuating (better) 4.438 .515 3.408 5.467
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Appendix J 
 
SPSS Output – Mediation Analyses 
 
Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a . Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.436a .190 .158 2.203
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
ANOVAb
84.443 3 28.148 5.799 .001a
359.211 74 4.854
443.654 77
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.619 .250 22.502 .000
-.069 .250 -.029 -.278 .782
.481 .250 .201 1.924 .058
-.931 .250 -.390 -3.726 .000
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a . Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.459a .211 .179 2.187
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
ANOVAb
94.702 3 31.567 6.599 .001a
353.978 74 4.783
448.679 77
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
5.022 .248 20.259 .000
.053 .248 .022 .213 .832
.803 .248 .335 3.238 .002
-.778 .248 -.324 -3.137 .002
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
STROOP,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.437a .191 .145 2.245
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), STROOP, CRIME, INTERAC,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
83.444 4 20.861 4.138 .005a
352.876 70 5.041
436.320 74
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), STROOP, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.672 .786 7.219 .000
-.034 .344 -.014 -.098 .922
.482 .262 .200 1.844 .069
-.929 .261 -.385 -3.559 .001
-.027 .828 -.005 -.033 .974
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
STROOP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
STROOP,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.482a .233 .189 2.169
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), STROOP, CRIME, INTERAC,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
99.785 4 24.946 5.304 .001a
329.201 70 4.703
428.987 74
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), STROOP, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
5.553 .759 7.318 .000
.158 .332 .066 .476 .636
.913 .253 .381 3.613 .001
-.671 .252 -.281 -2.663 .010
-.682 .799 -.120 -.854 .396
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
STROOP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
sentence
span
score,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.437a .191 .147 2.217
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), sentence span score, CRIME,
INTERAC, AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
84.832 4 21.208 4.315 .003a
358.822 73 4.915
443.654 77
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), sentence span score, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.859 .889 6.588 .000
-.108 .287 -.045 -.378 .707
.473 .253 .198 1.871 .065
-.912 .260 -.382 -3.511 .001
-.054 .193 -.035 -.281 .779
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
sentence span score
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
sentence
span
score,
CRIME,
INTERAC,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.484a .235 .193 2.169
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), sentence span score, CRIME,
INTERAC, AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
105.256 4 26.314 5.593 .001a
343.424 73 4.704
448.679 77
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), sentence span score, CRIME, INTERAC, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
3.772 .870 4.335 .000
.255 .281 .106 .910 .366
.842 .247 .351 3.407 .001
-.874 .254 -.364 -3.440 .001
.283 .189 .180 1.498 .138
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
sentence span score
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
PARAG,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.440a .194 .147 2.229
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), PARAG, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
ANOVAb
82.313 4 20.578 4.142 .005a
342.836 69 4.969
425.149 73
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), PARAG, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.828 .594 9.806 .000
-.028 .293 -.012 -.094 .925
.565 .277 .235 2.038 .045
-.883 .260 -.368 -3.398 .001
-.360 .863 -.054 -.418 .678
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
PARAG
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
PARAG,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.485a .235 .191 2.171
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), PARAG, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
ANOVAb
99.914 4 24.979 5.302 .001a
325.072 69 4.711
424.986 73
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), PARAG, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
5.471 .579 9.454 .000
.126 .285 .052 .440 .661
.953 .270 .397 3.528 .001
-.711 .253 -.297 -2.811 .006
-.814 .840 -.121 -.968 .336
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
PARAG
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
Speed
average
time,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.453a .205 .161 2.208
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Speed average time, INTERAC,
CRIME, AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
90.644 4 22.661 4.646 .002a
351.174 72 4.877
441.818 76
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Speed average time, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
6.492 .782 8.302 .000
.176 .332 .073 .530 .598
.491 .252 .205 1.947 .055
-.921 .252 -.384 -3.655 .000
-.001 .000 -.166 -1.197 .235
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
Speed average time
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
Speed
average
time,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.502a .252 .210 2.121
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Speed average time, INTERAC,
CRIME, AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
109.103 4 27.276 6.063 .000a
323.884 72 4.498
432.987 76
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Speed average time, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
3.731 .751 4.968 .000
-.361 .319 -.152 -1.132 .261
.859 .242 .362 3.551 .001
-.721 .242 -.304 -2.979 .004
.001 .000 .234 1.743 .086
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
Speed average time
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
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Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attacker 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
EXECFUN,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Model Summary
.439a .193 .146 2.230
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), EXECFUN, INTERAC, CRIME,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
82.052 4 20.513 4.125 .005a
343.096 69 4.972
425.149 73
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), EXECFUN, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackerb. 
Coefficientsa
5.604 .260 21.579 .000
-.013 .331 -.005 -.038 .969
.552 .272 .230 2.033 .046
-.879 .261 -.367 -3.370 .001
-.133 .382 -.050 -.349 .728
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
EXECFUN
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: how dangerous is attackera. 
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Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for 
offender 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
EXECFUN,
INTERAC,
CRIME,
AGE
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or
max sentence for offender
b. 
Model Summary
.486a .236 .192 2.169
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), EXECFUN, INTERAC, CRIME,
AGE
a. 
ANOVAb
100.405 4 25.101 5.336 .001a
324.581 69 4.704
424.986 73
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), EXECFUN, INTERAC, CRIME, AGEa. 
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offenderb. 
Coefficientsa
4.965 .253 19.657 .000
.201 .322 .084 .625 .534
.940 .264 .392 3.557 .001
-.697 .254 -.291 -2.749 .008
-.380 .372 -.142 -1.021 .311
(Constant)
AGE
CRIME
INTERAC
EXECFUN
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: recommend min or max sentence for offendera. 
